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ABSTRACT 
 
Reading the Sowetan’s mediation of the public’s response to the Jacob 
Zuma rape trial: A critical discourse analysis 
 
Alison Stent 
MA minithesis, Department of Journalism and Media Studies, Rhodes University 
 
In this minithesis I conduct a critical discourse analysis to take on a double-pronged task. 
On the one hand I explore the social phenomenon of the contestation between supporters 
of then-ANC deputy president Jacob Zuma and supporters of his rape accuser. The trial, 
which took place in the Johannesburg High Court between mid-February and early May 
2006, stirred intense public interest, both locally and internationally. The performance of 
thousands of Zuma’s supporters and a far smaller number of gender rights lobby groups, 
both of whom kept a presence outside the court building throughout the trial, received 
similar attention. Second, I examine how the Sowetan, a national daily tabloid with a 
black, middle-class readership, mediated the trial through pictures of the theatre outside 
the court and letters to the editor.  
 
The study is informed by post-Marxist and cultural studies perspectives, both approaches 
that are concerned with issues of power, ideology and the circulation of meaning within 
specific sociocultural contexts.  A rudimentary thematic content analysis draws out some 
of the main themes from the material, while the critical discourse analysis is located 
within a theoretical framework based on concepts from Laclau & Mouffe’s theory of 
meaning, which assumes a power struggle between contesting positions seeking to 
invalidate one another and to either challenge or support existing hegemonies. This is 
further informed by, first, Laclau’s theorisation of populism, which assumes that diverse 
groupings can unite under a demagogue’s banner in shared antagonism towards existing 
power, and second, by concepts from Mamdani’s theorisation of power and resistance in 
colonial and post-colonial Africa, which explicates three overarching ideological 
discourses of human rights, social justice and traditional ethnic practices. The study, then, 
explores how these three discourses were operationalised by the localised contestations 
over the trial.         December 2007 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The scope of the study 
 
The rape trial of then-ANC deputy president Jacob Zuma in the Johannesburg High Court 
between mid-February and early May 2006 stirred intense public interest and received 
extensive attention from the news media, even at times making international news. The 
performance of thousands of Zuma’s supporters and a far smaller number of gender 
rights lobby groups, both of whom kept a presence outside the court building throughout 
the trial, received similar attention. 
  
The rape complainant, an overnight guest at Zuma’s Johannesburg home in November 
2005, was an HIV-positive Aids activist half his age, whose father had been Zuma’s 
comrade during South Africa’s liberation struggle against apartheid.  Zuma at the time 
was head of the council that advises the government on HIV-Aids policy, a married man 
and head of a “moral regeneration” programme aimed at promoting safe sexual practice.  
 
Although this combination generated considerable outrage, Zuma’s popularity with South 
Africa’s masses appeared not dented but enhanced, to the point where his accuser was 
symbolically executed by his supporters. In addition the party’s youth league and two 
partners in governance, Cosatu and the SACP, gave him their open and fervent support, 
even announcing their intention to nominate him as the country’s next president. 
 
The Sowetan, a national daily tabloid, is one of South Africa’s largest black-oriented 
daily newspapers.  This study, a mini-thesis in fulfilment of 35% of a Masters degree, 
explores the Sowetan’s mediation of the contestation between Zuma’s supporters and 
those of his rape accuser from a gender and class perspective.  Since it is specifically the 
South African public’s response to the trial that is under the microscope, I focus on the 
Sowetan’s pictures of the contestation outside the court (particularly those representing 
body performance and messages on clothes and posters) and letters to its editor about the 
trial, thus deliberately excluding journalists’ news reports and commentary to isolate the 
 2
‘voices’ of the citizenry. I first undertake a rudimentary thematic content analysis of this 
material to gain a ‘broad descriptive sweep’ of it before conducting a critical discourse 
analysis.  
 
The significance of the study 
Democratic South Africa is one of post-colonial Africa’s leading countries politically and 
economically, and its constitution is recognised as being among the most progressive in 
the world. Nonetheless, the democracy faces severe challenges, not the least of which is 
the fact that many of the rights inscribed in the constitution, particularly second 
generation socio-economic rights, have yet to be felt by the country’s desperately poor 
and unemployed majority. According to Mamdani (1996) the greatest challenge facing 
democracy in Africa is a rural-urban divide that has left colonially co-opted and perverted 
traditional authorities intact in rural areas, a divide between modernity and ‘tradition’ that 
exists in South Africa no less than its northern neighbours. Gender equality too, while 
inscribed in the constitution, is far from the quotidian reality of most South Africans, 
whether employed or unemployed, urban, rural or peri-urban. 
 
Jacob Zuma’s rape trial, I argue in this study, threw these three sets of ‘unfinished 
business’ – class justice, gender justice and the relationship between tradition and 
modernity – into sharp relief, often pitting them against one another in different 
combinations. However, while modernity is often equated with Western discourses such 
as that of universal and individual human rights (including gender equality), it should 
never be forgotten that Western societies are themselves rooted in traditions as patriarchal 
and misogynistic as any customary rural one in Africa1. Suttner, for example, discussing 
the trial, speaks of the ‘commonality of patriarchy across cultures’ (2007:9) and notes 
that Zuma, a Zulu, and the white Afrikaans trial judge (whom Suttner refers to as 
‘kindred spirits’ (2007: 12)) both ‘deployed well-worn stereotypes of what one expects a 
woman to do when she is raped’ (2007:11). 
 
                                                 
1 See for example Mmatshilo Motsei’s The Kanga and the Kangaroo Court (2007). 
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If the aim of discourse analysis is to ‘map out the processes of a struggle to fix meaning’ 
(Phillips and Jorgensen 2002: 24-5), ‘the word ‘critical’ signals a focus on the role played 
by discourse in establishing and maintaining relations of domination’ (Janks 1998:195).  
It is the work of critical discourse analysis, therefore, to examine how power works 
through language, or to be more specific, to expose the discursive strategies deployed in 
attempts to fix meaning, as well as to identify whether they are attempts to challenge or 
to support existing hegemonies. 
 
This study, then, attempts to throw some light on the unprecedented spectacle outside the 
courtroom by using critical discourse analysis principles to examine how wider 
discursive struggles over class, traditionalism/modernity and gender are operationalised 
in the localised contestation between Zuma’s supporters and those of the rape 
complainant as they construct antagonistic identities for the two figures. I examine 
apparent contradictions in Zuma’s diverse support base (such as rights-based, urban 
organisations espousing a nationalistic ideology, like Cosatu and the SACP, gathering 
under a banner painted overtly in ethnic, customary colours) in light of Laclau’s (2005) 
theorisation of populism and link this with a perspective on class issues that is specific to 
Africa’s struggle to free itself of colonialism, and which identifies a ‘breach’ between the 
discourses of social justice and human rights (Mamdani 1996: 20-21). Finally, I examine 
the Sowetan’s role in mediating this contestation for its readers. 
 
The context of the study 
Political context 
When the African National Congress (ANC) came to power in South Africa’s first 
democratic election in 1994, it pre-empted potential leftist opposition by taking as formal 
alliance partners the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu) and the South 
African Communist Party (SACP). One of the new government’s first projects was to 
unify an ethnically, racially and culturally divided country under a nationalistic discourse.  
Another stated aim was to improve the lives of South Africa’s desperately poor, 
unemployed majority.  By the end of the first decade of democracy, the centre-right, but 
regionally and ethnically based Inkatha Freedom Party, comprising mainly Zulus in 
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KwaZulu-Natal, had lost significant support to the ANC and the far right white, such as 
the Conservative Party, was an insignificant minority. However the ANC’s two alliance 
partners and many of the country’s poor had become increasingly disillusioned with the 
ANC’s liberal capitalist economic policies, which had fantastically enriched a new black 
elite.  Dissatisfaction began to crystallise around who would succeed the country’s 
second president, Thabo Mbeki, both as ANC president in 2007 and as the country’s 
president in 2009. 
 
Jacob Zuma, Mbeki’s deputy, seemed the obvious choice. However he was dismissed by 
Mbeki in June 2005 after being charged with fraud and corruption after allegedly 
accepting a bribe from a bidder in an international arms procurement deal. Zuma’s 
financial advisor, who allegedly brokered the deal, was found guilty for his role in a 
separate trial. Before Zuma’s fraud trial could come to court, two things happened, both 
around late 2005. First he was charged with rape. Second was what came to be known as 
‘the hoax e-mail saga’. This was a series of about 100 emails and chatroom transcripts, 
purported to be correspondence between senior ANC officials, the head of the National 
Prosecuting Authority and several senior journalists determined to keep Zuma from 
power. In the correspondence, which was rejected by the presidency as a hoax, Zuma is 
derogatorily referred to as ‘the Zulu boy’, a term implying ignorant country bumpkin.   
 
Zuma has alleged since the fraud allegations first emerged that there is a conspiracy to 
derail his chances of succeeding Mbeki. He has constructed both sets of criminal charges 
and certain sections of the media as part of this plot, and has threatened to sue various 
publications, including the Sowetan, for their portrayals of him. From a poor, uneducated 
background himself, Zuma has constructed his identity as a simple rural man with strong 
customary roots, in stark contrast to the intellectual and well-educated Mbeki who, like 
his predecessor Nelson Mandela, is a Xhosa, and who is seen as having abandoned the 
rural poor. The term ‘Zulu boy’ was appropriated by Zuma’s supporters during the rape 
trial as their rallying cry, an indication of the strong ethnic element in his support base. 
One aspect of this study examines the Sowetan’s coverage of this rural, customary 
discourse.  
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Media context 
The Sowetan has a national circulation of about 1.6 million2 that targets an English-
literate black readership. Yet its history is one that responded to the marginalisation of 
black readers; it began in 1981 as a free delivery, and under the editorship of academic 
and anti-apartheid activist Aggrey Klaaste from 1988 to 2002, became well-respected in 
progressive and academic circles. By the time South African media conglomerate Johnnic 
Communications (now Avusa) acquired a controlling share in 2004, the Sowetan was in 
competition with the national daily tabloid, The Sun, and shares many of the layout 
features that traditionally set tabloids apart from broadsheets. However its target market 
is middle class as opposed to The Sun’s working class one, and the Sowetan has retained 
a fairly strong human rights framework. The news media are argued to play an important 
role in society both in setting the agenda (not as much for what people should think, as 
for what they should think about) and for providing the frame through which to view 
events (see for example Cook et al 1983; McCombs 2001). For this reason, the way the 
Sowetan chose to represent and frame the events surrounding Jacob Zuma’s rape trial is 
considered significant. 
 
 
Structure of the study 
 
This chapter has outlined the parameter and scope of the study, touching on its aims and 
methods and briefly sketching the context of the topic. In the following chapter I explain 
the broad theoretical framework within which the study is located, and discuss the themes 
that link the aims and methods. Chapter Three discusses the methodological 
considerations underpinning the thematic content analysis and critical discourse analysis. 
Chapter Four comprises the analysis itself, and in Chapter Five I sum up the findings and 
draw some conclusions. 
                                                 
2 Interview with Sowetan operations manager Yusuf Patel, 13 June 2007;  www.biz-
community.com/Article/196/90/9116.html, accessed 7 January 2007 
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 CHAPTER TWO: ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
 
Introduction 
In Chapter One it was noted that as a populist figure Zuma has drawn supporters with 
widely disparate and sometimes conflicting positions. Unified under the rallying cry of 
‘100% Zulu boy’, they enacted intense symbolic violence towards the rape complainant 
outside the courtroom during the trial, while most of the demands articulated on their 
posters had nothing to do with the trial at all. Gender activists and rape support groups 
also gathered outside the court to demonstrate in support of the complainant, and a strong 
police presence was needed to keep physical violence between the two contesting groups 
to a minimum. These performances were only one measure of the public’s intense sense 
of involvement in the trial. The polarisation was also evident in numerous radio talk 
shows and television debates, and there was a proliferation of websites, blogs, letters to 
the press and even music written expressing both positions.  
 
Although in a sense the public’s involvement was a sideshow to the main drama of Zuma 
and his accuser’s disclosures inside the court, the contestation between the two positions 
takes centre stage in this investigation. As mentioned above, Chapter Four focuses on two 
forms of the public’s response  produced in the Sowetan: first the formal letters to the 
editor, the designated site for public expression, and second, photographs of the protests 
outside the court, where messages are recorded in the form of posters, dress, slogans on 
clothing and body performances such as burning effigies.  In this chapter I outline an 
analytical framework that may help to ‘plot the course of these struggles to fix meaning’ 
(Phillips & Jorgensen 2002: 24) as the two positions deploy various strategies to 
construct their own positions and identities as valid in contrast to the contesting position 
which is constructed as ‘other’; that is, alien, irrational and invalid. 
  
In the belief that the contesting discourses surrounding the rape trial and the succession 
race could have profound implications for the quality of South Africa’s democracy, I 
have chosen to ground this study in a social constructivist approach to representation. To 
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unpack this a little, if representation is understood as the production of meaning through 
language (Hall 1997: 28), constructivism’s central concept is that language plays an 
active role in creating and shifting meaning (Hall 1997: 28). By implication then, 
particular messages and their consequent understandings of the world lead to particular 
actions, and in this way, language and the construction of knowledge has social 
consequences. Four theoretical strands within the constructivist approach to 
representation that are relevant to the investigation are discussed below. 
 
First, Michel Foucault’s ideas have been widely deployed in the development of both 
representation theory and discourse analysis (Phillips & Jorgensen 2002: 12; Hall 1997: 
42). His radically historicised notions of power/knowledge, discourse, ‘truth’ and the 
subject discussed below have been seminal in the field of critical social theory and have 
been taken up by many influential analysts, including Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe 
(Phillips & Jorgensen 2002: 12-13), who are discussed in later sections.  Foucault’s 
conceptualisations are therefore briefly outlined to form the foundations on which the 
analytical framework is built. However, while his ideas underpin the analytic approach of 
Laclau and Mouffe, their departures from Foucault also usefully inform this study, and it 
is their concepts on which the analysis in Chapter Four is based. In particular I employ 
their conceptualisation of discourses as struggling for hegemony through the 
appropriation of nodal points, which in turn organise discourse through chains of 
equivalence. Third, Laclau’s (2005) analysis of populism, which partly informs the 
protest analysis in Chapter Four, throws light on the disparate and sometimes 
contradictory collection of groups supporting Zuma. Finally, Mamdani’s theorisation of 
power and resistance in post-colonial Africa provides the necessary framework to 
contextualise three identified discourses at play in the pro- and anti-Zuma contestation, 
namely a rights-based discourse, a customary or ethnic one and a third which Mamdani 
calls ‘social justice’. I outline each theory in turn. 
 
Foucault and the social constructivist approach to representation  
There are two concepts central to the social constructivist approach to representation: 
first, as mentioned above, that discourse shapes meaning and second, that meaning (in 
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forms such as world views, identities and knowledge) is historically contingent (Phillips 
& Jorgensen 2002:5). In other words, through discourse, we create representations of 
reality that are never mere reflections of a pre-existing reality but contribute to 
constructing reality; second, the social worlds so created are historically and culturally 
specific and shifting. 
 
While Foucault did not set out to develop a theory of representation, his contribution to 
social constructivism and the current understanding of representation is considered 
profound (Hall 1997: 42; Phillips & Jorgensen 2002: 12). Preoccupied with the 
mechanisms of social control exercised by and in modern state institutions3, Foucault 
radically altered concepts such as discourse, truth, power and subjectivity, not least by his 
insistence on the historical contingency of knowledge and ‘truth’. In his earlier 
‘archaeological’ phase, his aim was to ‘analyse how human beings understand themselves 
in our culture and how our knowledge about the social, the embodied individual and 
shared meanings comes to be produced in different periods’ (Hall 1997: 43). What 
concerned him, according to Hall, was ‘the production of knowledge (rather than just 
meaning) through what he called discourse (rather than just language)’ (Hall 1997: 42-3, 
italics inserted).  
 
Foucault’s conceptualisation of discourse and knowledge  
Clearly then, we need to explicate Foucault’s influential conceptualisations of knowledge 
(as opposed to meaning) and discourse (as opposed to language), which were a radical 
departure from the semiotic approach to representation, whereby representation relates to 
the way words function as signs within language (Hall 1997: 42). For Foucault, whose 
project was to understand relations of power, not relations of meaning, the semiotic 
approach was restrictive: he was concerned to analyse ‘relations of force, strategic 
developments and tactics’ (Hall 1997: 43). Semiotics, as the study of signs in 
communication, could not therefore account for what he termed the ‘intrinsic 
intelligibility of conflicts’ (Hall 1997: 43).  To this end, he expanded the 
                                                 
3 Foucault’s major works focused on madness and medical discourse, discipline and the penal institutions 
and sexuality. 
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conceptualisation of discourse from simply a linguistic one that referred to passages of 
connected writing or speech, to one which included both language and practice, and saw 
his task as: 
A task that consists of not – of no longer – treating discourses as groups of signs 
(signifying elements referring to contents or representations) but as practices that 
systematically form the objects of which they speak. (Foucault 1972:49 in 
Prinsloo 2002: 17) 
 
In other words not only language but the social practices that go with it operate together 
to shape the ways the world is experienced. Foucault turned his attention to the way that 
language and ‘practices’ in modern state institutions operated to produce ‘regimes of 
truth’ (Hall 1997: 49) or the body of knowledge and understanding that existed at the 
time about a topic. He wanted to explicate ‘how the rules of inclusion and exclusion work 
that govern which statements are accepted as meaningful and true’ (Phillips & Jorgensen 
2002: 12), and, to this end, he described the discursive strategies that he proposed were 
used to delimit the field of objects, define a legitimate perspective and fix norms for how 
concepts and theories were elaborated (Foucault 1981). Together, these strategies 
construct the topic, define and produce the objects of knowledge, govern the way it can 
and cannot be talked about and regulate conduct in relation to that topic, rendering 
anyone who tries to speak or act outside these limits unintelligible. Control mechanisms 
extrinsic to discourse itself include those rituals governing who can speak and when, and 
taboos on certain topics, attitudes and behaviours, while discourses themselves, Foucault 
held, also exerted internal controls such as the use of commentary to guide how people 
think about a topic and rules governing who is qualified to speak on it (Foucault 1981). 
  
Foucault’s conceptualisation of power and truth 
It will be clear from the above that for Foucault, there was no ‘truth’ because the 
imaginable repertoire of concepts and behaviours was constrained differently in different 
historical eras:  
Truth isn’t outside power. ... Truth is a thing of this world; it is produced only by 
virtue of multiple forms of constraint. And it induces regular effects of power. 
Each society has its regime of truth, its ‘general politics’ of truth; that is, the types 
of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true, the mechanisms and 
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instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by 
which each is sanctioned ... the status of those who are charged with saying what 
counts as true.  (Foucault 1980: 131 in Hall 1997: 49)  
 
This insistence on the historical discontinuity of knowledge is considered one of 
Foucault’s major contributions to contemporary thinking: he made way for an 
understanding of the contingent and shifting nature of how discursive formations 
sustained different ‘truth regimes’ at different times (Hall 1997: 49; Phillips & Jorgensen 
2002: 12).  Social theorists like Laclau and Mouffe, for example, embraced this view, as 
discussed in this chapter.   
 
In his second, or ‘genealogical’ phase, Foucault turned his attention to the way discourse 
works to shape its social world, focusing on political power relations and the way 
discourse was embedded in institutional and material practices (Phillips & Jorgensen 
2002: 16). His conceptualisation of power was radical in that he insisted that power is not 
simply negative, top-down and repressive but productive, and that it cannot be held, only 
deployed:  
What makes power hold good, what makes it accepted, is simply the fact that it 
does not only weigh on us as a force that says no, but that it traverses and 
produces things, it induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse. It 
needs to be considered as a productive network which runs through the whole 
social body, much more than as a negative instance whose function is repression 
(Foucault 1980:119 in Phillips & Jorgensen 2002:13) 
 
Thus power is understood as producing, among other things, discourse and knowledge, 
and as circulating at every level of social life.   
 
Foucault’s conceptualisation of the subject 
If constructivism implies a rejection of the autonomous Cartesian subject, (Hall 1992: 
282) this similarly applies to Foucault’s discursive, historicised subject. For Foucault it is 
discourses, not the subjects who speak it, that produce knowledge – and in fact subjects 
themselves are produced within discourse. Subjects may produce texts, but they operate 
within ‘regimes of truth’ specific to a culture and era, and are thus ‘subjected to’ its rules 
 11
and conventions. They can relay power/knowledge but not stand outside it (Hall 1997: 
55). Foucault’s subject is shaped or ‘disciplined’ from an early age by ‘microtechnologies 
of power’ that operate at body level; s/he is inserted into pre-existing discourses at 
schools, prisons, factories, churches, and arguably families, to be transformed and 
improved (Prinsloo 2002: 25-7):  
 
In thinking of the mechanisms of power, I am thinking rather of its capillary  
form of existence, the point where power reaches into the very grain of  
individuals, touches their bodies and inserts itself into their action and their 
attitudes, their discourses, learning processes and everyday lives. (Foucault  
1980 in Prinsloo 2002: 27)  
 
However, importantly, Foucault was clear that subjects need to be constituted as 
autonomous: “Modern power is tolerable only on condition that it mask a substantial part 
of itself. Its success is proportional to its ability to hide its own mechanisms” (Foucault in 
Prinsloo 2002: 27).  Thus power disciplines the body to produce what he called ‘docile’ 
or willing subjects; the ANC for example has a powerful disciplining discourse that 
includes among other mechanisms, a taboo against fostering divisive ethnicism within its 
ranks. 
 
Laclau and Mouffe’s theory of meaning 
Operating similarly within a social constructivist position, Laclau and Mouffe’s starting 
point is that discourse shapes meaning, and that meaning can never be ultimately fixed 
since it is historically contingent. In line with Foucault’s theorisation, discourse is 
understood to comprise both language and social practice. They also subscribe to his 
conceptualisation of power, understanding it not as something that is held and exercised 
over others, but as that which produces the social in particular ways at particular times. In 
other words the social world, including all knowledge, identity formations and social 
relations are contingent and shifting (Phillips & Jorgensen 2002: 37).  The implication is 
that Laclau and Mouffe’s theory is inherently political, not in the narrow sense of party 
politics but in the sense that forms of social organisation are the outcomes of political 
processes which have excluded all other forms (Phillips & Jorgensen 2002: 36). 
 
 12
Terms and concepts in Laclau and Mouffe’s theory of meaning 
Below I outline the terms and concepts in Laclau and Mouffe’s theory of how meaning is 
created and contested. The analogy of a fishing net has been used to explicate their 
understanding of discourse, with linguistic signs as the knots in the net. Thus each ‘knot’ 
derives its meaning from its relation to other knots:  
Signs acquire their meanings by being different from each other, but, in ongoing 
language use, we position the signs in different relations to one another so that 
they may acquire new meanings… it is through conventions, negotiations and 
conflicts in social contexts that structures of meaning are fixed and challenged’. 
(Phillips & Jorgensen 2002: 25) 
 
However, whereas Saussurian structuralism saw the net as fixed and stable, post-
structuralists like Laclau and Mouffe hold that its stability is constantly challenged by 
contesting attempts to fix alternative meanings. 
 
According to Laclau and Mouffe then, a discourse is the structured totality of the net, or 
in other words ‘the fixation of meaning within a particular domain’ (Phillips & Jorgensen 
2002: 24-6). If signs occur as elements with potential multiple meanings, once deployed 
within a discourse they become fixed, however temporarily. The social practices that 
establish, or fix, their relations with other signs are termed articulations. For example, in 
the context of a developmental psychology discourse the word ‘independence’ takes on a 
certain meaning when fixed (articulated) in relation with signs indicating ‘milestones’ 
such as walking alone and feeding oneself. However in a post-colonial discourse it would 
take on a different meaning as a result of articulations with signs such as ‘struggle’, 
‘oppression’ or ‘foreign power’.  
 
The political implications of this are crucial to this study, because specific articulations, 
by fixing meaning in particular ways, work to either reproduce or challenge existing 
discourses. If each sign is perpetually potentially polysemous, every social practice or 
expression is an articulation. However, in addition to this, each articulation also draws on 
earlier fixations of meaning – that is, even though it is an innovation, it nonetheless draws 
on wider discourses in which signs have become fixed and naturalised to varying degrees 
(Phillips & Jorgensen 2002: 29). In the context of this study, then, every letter to the 
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editor, each T-shirt, handwritten poster or body performance in a protest march is an 
articulation, an attempt to fix meaning in the given terrain, while at the same time it 
draws on other pre-existing discourses (for example those of human rights, social justice 
or ethnic custom). This point underpins the analysis in Chapter Four. 
I turn now to the internal functioning of a discourse, or from its anatomy to its 
physiology, so to speak. According to Laclau and Mouffe, there are certain ‘key 
signifiers’ in a discourse that function as an organising principle: ‘A ‘nodal point’ is a 
privileged sign around which the other signs are ordered; the other signs acquire their 
meaning from their relationship to the nodal point’ (Phillips & Jorgensen 2002: 26). 
Phillips & Jorgensen use the example of ‘body’ as a nodal point in a medical discourse; 
in this study of the contesting positions over the rape trial, the main nodal point, I argue, 
is ‘Zuma’. Phillips & Jorgensen add that ‘floating signifiers’ are the signs, or elements, 
that different discourses struggle to invest with meaning in their own particular way: 
 Nodal points are floating signifiers, but whereas the term ‘nodal point’ refers to a 
point of crystallisation within a specific discourse, the term ‘floating signifier’ 
belongs to the ongoing struggle between different discourses to fix the meaning of 
important signs. (Phillips & Jorgensen 2002: 26) 
Thus discourses struggle to achieve hegemony, or social consensus, in the Gramscian 
sense (Simon 1982: 21). In other words, they struggle to appropriate the floating 
signifiers in the contested terrain between them and turn them into nodal points by 
investing them with their own meaning. This takes place through the social practices of 
articulation, which organise signs or moments around nodal points in chains of 
equivalence (Phillips & Jorgensen 2002: 43). In a patriarchal disc
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consensus that has been accepted as ‘truth’ and reveal its contingency, but to examine 
how hegemonies were put in place: 
The aim of analysis is, therefore, not to uncover the objective reality, for example, 
to find out what groups society ‘really’ consists of, but to explore how we create 
this reality so that it appears objective and natural… the starting point of Laclau 
and Mouffe’s discourse theory is that we construct objectivity through the 
discursive production of meaning. It is that construction process that should be the 
target of analysis. (Phillips & Jorgensen 2002: 33) 
 
The construction of identity in Laclau and Mouffe’s theory 
For Laclau and Mouffe discourses constitute identities. To discuss this concept I return to 
the issue of articulation, that is, those social practices that link floating signifiers with 
other signs in a discourse, investing them with meaning through their relation to other 
signs. This is central to  Laclau and Mouffe’s theorisation of  the formation of both 
individual and group identities, thus going right to the heart of this study, which is at once 
an investigation of the contesting positions over Zuma’s identity, an examination of how 
Zuma’s support group is constituted and a critical look at the Sowetan’s mediation of 
these. 
Like Foucault, Laclau and Mouffe reject the classical Western understanding of the 
individual as an autonomous subject. For them, both individual and collective identities 
are organised according to the principles of the discursive processes outlined above. I 
begin with individual identity. Borrowing and adapting4 Althusser’s concept of 
interpellation, Laclau and Mouffe hold that discourses interpellate individuals in 
particular ‘subject positions’, (a term which they conflate with that of identity (Phillips & 
Jorgensen 2002: 43)). In other words, people are placed in certain positions by particular 
ways of talking: ‘If a child says ‘mum’ and the adult responds, then the adult has become 
interpellated with a particular identity – a ‘mother’ – to which particular expectations 
                                                 
4 Phillips & Jorgensen point out that in Althusser’s theory there is an economic determinism incompatible 
with discourse theory: Althusser understands the interpellation of subjects as ideological as it hides the true 
relations between people. To Laclau and Mouffe, there are no ‘true’ social relations determined by the 
economy (P&J 2002: 41) 
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about her behaviour are attached. In discourse theoretical terms, the subjects become 
positions in discourses’ (Phillips & Jorgensen 2002: 40). 
Thus discourses designate positions for people to occupy as subjects, with a 
corresponding set of expectations about how to act, what to say and what not to say. 
Incorporating Jacques Lacan’s (1997) theorisation of the subject as ‘as a perpetually 
incomplete structure which constantly strives to become a whole’ gave Laclau and 
Mouffe’s subject a ‘driving force’, as it constantly tries to ‘find itself’ through investing 
in different discourses (Phillips & Jorgensen 2002: 42). This is linked with Laclau and 
Mouffe’s second departure from Althusser (see footnote 4 for the first departure). For 
them, subjects are ‘fragmented’ or ‘decentred’; that is, each individual is interpellated by 
many discourses – mother, daughter, taxi driver, ANC supporter, part-time student, tenant 
and dinner guest might be only a few. When these interpellations give conflicting 
instructions on how to behave, for example in certain interpretations of ‘feminist’ and 
‘Christian’, the subject is said to be ‘overdetermined’, or to put it another way, an 
antagonism is set up: ‘A social antagonism occurs when different identities mutually 
exclude each other … Thus, antagonisms can be found where discourses collide’ (Phillips 
& Jorgensen 2002: 47-8).  
To summarise, meanings and identities are discursively constituted through chains of 
equivalence that link signs together in opposition to other chains. These define how the 
subject is, and how it is not. Secondly, identity is always relationally organised, in other 
words, it is something because it is contrasted with something that it is not. Or to put it 
another way, ‘it is by being represented by a cluster of signs with a nodal point at its 
centre that one acquires an identity. Identities are accepted, refused and negotiated in 
discursive processes’ (Phillips & Jorgensen 2002: 43). 
We turn now to Laclau and Mouffe’s theorisation of collective identity, a discussion 
which in several fundamental aspects foreshadows Laclau’s (2005) analysis of populism, 
discussed in the section below. Individual identities, as discussed above, are formed 
through chains of equivalence. Group identities follow a similar ‘logic of equivalence’, 
that is, chains of equivalence establish some possibilities of identification while others 
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are ignored (Phillips & Jorgensen 2002: 44). For example let us take the contentious term 
‘African’. For some, this term might be reserved for all the dark-skinned peoples on the 
continent who were once oppressed by European colonialism. For others, it may mean 
anyone who was born on the continent and who chooses to identify with the term. For 
still others it could refer to anyone who was born here no matter where they live now. 
Egypt, on the other hand, considers itself and is internationally accepted as part of the 
Middle East rather than part of Africa (except when it comes to soccer). The category is 
further blurred with sub-categories like ‘African American’, most of whom have never 
been to Africa and will never even think of coming. Then there are complications like 
islands: Zanzibar is discursively constituted as ‘part of Africa’ (and its citizens therefore 
as Africans) while Madagascar is not. Be that as it may, group identities, like individual 
ones, are discursively constituted by what they are not; the ‘other’, or whatever is 
understood to be excluded from the group. The erstwhile Pan Africanist Congress may 
have defined ‘African’ in opposition to ‘settler’ while the apartheid government set up 
equally contentious divisions between ‘African’, ‘coloured’, ‘Indian’ and ‘white’.  
A second discursive strategy deployed by the logic of equivalence is that all differences 
within the group are ignored. The discursive antithesis to the logic of equivalence, 
therefore, is the ‘logic of difference’, where heterogeneities within the group are 
foregrounded. Christians, for example, are Protestant or Catholic; within the Protestant 
group are Methodists, Anglicans and Presbyterians, each of these is further divided into 
charismatic and orthodox and so on. Hence, as Phillips & Jorgensen phrase it, ‘different 
understandings of society divide the social space into different groups … [and the] 
understanding of society which prevails, and the group division that this implies, have 
critical consequences for our actions’ (Phillips & Jorgensen 2002: 46).  
Thus I propose to analyse the contestations over Zuma’s identity by examining how 
articulations (that is, social practices) reproduce, challenge or transform existing 
discourses in the field by organising chains of equivalence around nodal points; or in 
other words, map the process of the struggle to ‘hegemonically pin down the meaning 
of… floating signifier[s]’ (Phillips & Jorgensen 2002: 51) and thus (temporarily at least) 
fix meaning.  
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Laclau’s theory of populism 
 
Laclau’s conceptualisation (2005) of populism as a form of discourse is an elaboration of 
the theory of group identity formation described above. His point of departure is the 
definition of articulation that he developed with Mouffe (that is, any social practice that 
organises signs around nodal points in a discourse, be it a verbal, written or enacted 
expression). Next, he proposes that, since populist discourse can be found in both leftist 
and rightist political persuasions, populism be analysed not according to its ideological 
content, but according to the way that content is articulated, i.e. its ‘mode’ or ‘logic’ of 
articulation. The two modes of articulation that he brings into play were also introduced 
above, namely the paired concepts of ‘logic of equivalence’ and ‘logic of difference’, but 
he now uses them rather differently, as we shall see below. In sum, Laclau detects 
similarities across the political spectrum in the way the elements of a populist discourse 
are connected: ‘[the] articulating form, apart from its contents, produces structuring 
effects which primarily manifest themselves at the level of the modes of representation 
(Laclau 2005: 2). 
 
Differential and equivalential modes of articulation 
Laclau begins his analysis of populism by making the point that the ‘specifically political 
articulation’ of a social identity is defined by its attempt to bridge the gap between 
‘political will and communitarian space’ (2005: 3) (although, as he points out, no such 
attempt can ultimately succeed). Reiterating his and Mouffe’s earlier position that 
discourses interpellate individuals in particular subject positions or identities, he states: 
Individuals are not coherent totalities but merely referential identities which have 
to be split up into a series of localised subject positions.  And the articulation 
between these positions is a social and not an individual affair. (2005: 3) 
 
As the units or elements that build this social link, he proposes the theoretical category of 
‘demand’ (Laclau 2005: 4). Pointing out that in English the word ‘demand’ carries both 
the meaning of a request and its more active sense of imposing or claiming the request, 
he advances the idea that they correspond to two different modes of articulation. As an 
example of the first meaning, he offers a scenario where a group of people living in a 
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certain neighbourhood want a bus route introduced to transport them from their places of 
residence to the area in which most of them work, a request that is satisfied when they 
approach the ‘city hall’:  
The demand is a punctual demand, closed in itself – it is not the tip of an iceberg 
or the symbol of a large variety of unformulated social demands… requests of this 
type, in which demands are punctual or individually satisfied, do not construct 
any chasm or frontier within the social…. Each instance is a part (or a differential 
point) of a highly institutionalised social immanence. (Laclau 2005: 3) 
 
The social logics operating according to this ‘institutionalised, differential model’ are 
what Laclau calls the logics of difference: ‘They presuppose that there is no social 
division and that any legitimate demand can be satisfied in a non-antagonistic, 
administrative way’ (Laclau 2005: 3). 
 
Turning to the second meaning of ‘demand’, Laclau now has the request of his putative 
group rejected, as well as a large variety of other requests such as sanitation, housing and 
schooling, over a period of time. He predicts that the ‘multiple frustration’ will cause a 
new set of social logics: ‘Some kind of solidarity will arise between them all: all will 
share the fact that their demands remain unsatisfied.  That is, the demands share a 
negative dimension beyond their positive differential nature’ (Laclau 2005: 5). 
 
As the inverse of the earlier, differential situation, Laclau terms this second mode of 
articulation the ‘logic of equivalence’:  
All the demands, in spite of their differential character, tend to reaggregate 
themselves forming what we will call an equivalential chain.  This means that 
each individual demand is constitutively split: on the one hand it is its own 
particularised self; on the other it points, through equivalential links, to the totality 
of the other demands. (2005: 5)   
 
Returning to his earlier image, Laclau describes each of these demands as the tip of one 
large iceberg, which is the set of a large number of social claims. In other words, what 
articulates the ‘tips’ or demands is the ‘lack pervading them all’ (2005:6). 
 
He then differentiates between the subjects of the two types of demands, naming the first 
kind, the ones interpellated by differential logic ‘democratic subjects’. The type of 
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subject constituted by equivalential logic, on the other hand, will be wider, he points out, 
because its subjectivity is the result of the ‘equivalential aggregation of a plurality of 
democratic demands’. These he names ‘popular subjects’.  Here Laclau is careful to point 
out that rather than understanding the two modes of articulation as discrete opposites, 
they are better seen as occupying extreme ends of a continuum: 
[T]he more social demands tend to be differentially absorbed within a successful 
institutional system, the weaker the equivalential links will be and the more 
unlikely the constitution of a popular subjectivity; conversely, a situation in which 
a plurality of unsatisfied demands and an increasing inability of the institutional 
system to absorb them differentially coexist, creates the conditions leading to a 
populist rupture.  (2005: 5-6) 
 
The anti-institutional nature of populism 
A second condition necessary for a ‘populist rupture’, he continues, is the identification 
of the source of the negativity that links the rejected demands, in other words the entity 
that does the rejecting. In this way, equivalential or popular discourses dichotomise the 
social space, creating a chasm or ‘internal frontier’: they ‘divide the social into two 
camps: power and the underdog’ (2005: 6). In other words, importantly, a populist 
discourse espouses a pre-Foucauldian notion of power, one in which power is top-down, 
repressive and negative. It discursively totalises the institutional power in its 
representation of the power: ‘There is no populism without discursive construction of an 
enemy’ (2005: 7). It is this dichotomisation that ‘subverts the particularistic, differential 
character of the demands’ (2005: 6) that allowed for a notion of power as flowing and 
productive and turns them instead into the second, equivalential kind.  
 
It is this frame that enables one to understand two aspects of this study: first, Laclau’s 
dichotomy, the social chasm between the underdog and the top-down, repressive power 
of governing institutions corresponds with the proliferation of anti-Mbeki messages 
outside the courtroom during Zuma’s trial on posters, in songs and in physical 
performances such as burning pictures of him; and second, Laclau’s  understanding of the 
wide range of subjects drawn together under the banner of anti-institutional feeling that 
characterises populism makes sense of the odd, often contradictory juxtaposition of 
groupings that constellated under Zuma’s banner, such as urban, rights-based 
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organisations like Cosatu and the SACP alongside the ethnic Zulu base of his core 
support group. In the words of South African political commentator Xolela Mangcu: 
What Zuma has done rather remarkably is what [American rightwing politician 
George] Wallace did so many years ago in constructing a populist front. Zuma has 
combined various groups that had their own discrete gripes about Mbeki around a 
frontier against the latter’s centralised rule: the Congress of South African Trade 
Unions, the ANC Youth League, civil society organisations, black professionals 
and entrepreneurs, opinion makers, former senior government officials and ANC 
bigwigs. (Business Day 30 September 2006) 
 
In a nutshell, ‘the problem of populism is precisely that it embraces a range of diverse 
and often contradictory political beliefs’ (Beasley-Murray 2005: 2). In relation to this 
study, these include the ANC’s leftist alliance partners’ desire for less centrism and a 
more socialist economic policy; the bruised ethnic pride of the Zulu people; the 
construction of a conspiracy to prevent Zuma’s ascendancy to presidency and the 
genuinely desperate poverty and unemployment among the majority of South Africans, 
many of whom lack housing, employment, health care, access to schools or even clean 
water. 
 
Representation in populist discourse 
I return to Laclau’s exposition. Having made the crucial point that populism is inherently 
anti-institutional, he turns to the more complex problem of how a populist front can 
represent itself as a totality when it comprises a set of particularistic demands that are 
entirely different from each other. Here he returns to four more concepts discussed in the 
previous section: empty signifiers, floating ones, hegemony and nodal points (although 
he now refers to the latter as ‘central signifiers’): 
[T]hat representation [of disparate groupings as a unity] is only possible if a 
particular demand, without entirely abandoning its own particularity, starts also 
functioning as a signifier representing the chain as a totality…   This process by 
which a particular demand comes to represent an equivalential chain 
incommensurable with it is, of course, what we have called hegemony.  (2005: 7, 
italics in original) 
 
In other words, one demand takes precedence over all the others in order to symbolise 
them all. Here Laclau makes another crucial point: 
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The so-called ‘poverty’ of the populist symbols is the condition of their political 
efficacy – as their function is to bring to equivalential homogeneity a highly 
heterogeneous reality, they can only do so on the basis of reducing to a minimum 
their particularistic content.  At the limit, this process reaches a point where the 
homogeneizing function is carried out by a pure name: the name of the leader. 
(2005: 7, italics inserted)  
 
Within this study, I argue that Zuma becomes this leader.  As we shall see in Chapter 
Four, his supporters wore T-shirts with his face and name emblazoned on them, while 
their posters articulated demands ranging from the re-democratisation of the ANC, 
equations between Mbeki’s regime and apartheid, accusations that an anti-Zulu Xhosa 
cabal was in power and fury at the suggestion that the next state president could be a 
woman, to open threats of civil war – and all within the context of a rape trial. Thus 
Zuma’s name became the empty signifier that represented this heterogeneous and 
sometimes contradictory set of demands. 
 
Laclau offers two alternative scenarios for the de-polarisation of his two camps. As we 
have seen above, populist logic needs its nodal point to empty itself of content in 
proportion to the width of its reference; in other words, the more demands in the 
equivalential chain it represents, the less it can represent its own particularistic demand. 
Laclau’s first alternative is what he calls a ‘transformist operation’ (2005: 9). In this 
scenario the equivalential links between demands get broken by satisfying them: ‘This is 
the road to the decline of the populist form of politics, to the blurring of the internal 
frontiers and to the transition to a higher level of integration of the institutional system’ 
(2005: 9). 
His second alternative, one that does not involve the dissolution of the frontier, is by now 
familiar: it involves the re-articulation of the chains of equivalence while retaining the 
central signifier, or nodal point. In this study, Laclau’s first alternative equates to 
genuinely improving the lives of the poor and placing some checks on the power of the 
presidency, while the second involves separating Zuma from the idea of these 
improvements. 
But Laclau reiterates and emphasises his earlier caveat, that the boundary between 
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equivalential and differential discourses is fluid: 
To ask oneself if a movement is or is not populist is, actually, to start with the 
wrong question.  The question that we should, instead, ask ourselves, is the 
following: to what extent is a movement populist?  As we know, this question is 
identical to this other one: to what extent does the logic of equivalence dominate 
its discourse? (2005: 12)   
This point becomes important in examining the role the Sowetan plays in its mediation of 
the protesters outside court. Answering his own question, Laclau concludes that not only 
can no political movement be entirely ‘exempt’ from populism because they all, to some 
extent, interpellate the ‘people’ against an enemy, but that, in fact populism and politics 
are synonymous:  
The degree of ‘populism’, in that sense, will depend on the depth of the chasm 
separating political alternatives… Populism means putting into question the 
institutional order by constructing an underdog as an historical agent – i.e. an 
agent which is an other in relation to the way things stand.  But this is the same as 
politics.  We only have politics through the gesture which embraces the existing 
state of affairs as a system and presents an alternative to it. (2005: 14)   
In conclusion, he reaffirms his constructivist stance on representation, stating that the 
‘people’ is a construct of populist discourse, not a ‘primary datum’, and consequently it is 
representation that constitutes social reality, not the other way round. 
 
Power and resistance in Africa 
Citizen and subject 
Crucial to contextualising the study, which examines a power contestation in a South 
African context, is Mamdani’s (1996) theorisation of the organisation of power in Africa 
historically, the resilience of this organisation and the consequent forms that resistance 
takes in post-colonial Africa. In particular, Mamdani explicates the colonial legacy of a 
‘citizen-subject’ divide that left many African countries, including South Africa, with an 
urban-rural schism that has deep implications for democracy in Africa. As Prinsloo 
phrases it: 
Mamdani identifies how subjects in colonial Africa were produced by two 
conflicting discourses as either ‘citizens’ or ‘subjects’, the former being reserved 
 23
for the racially defined colonisers, the latter for the indigenous people. 
Importantly, the constitution of the indigenous people as ‘subject’ was not 
effected by direct rule or unmediated centralised despotism but depended on 
indirect rule, tribal leadership selectively constituted, and the relegation of the 
peasantry to customary law devolved into the hands of local despots. (2006: 7) 
 
Mamdani has, in other words, identified two discourses operating parallel in what he calls 
the ‘Janus-faced’ or ‘bifurcated’ colonial state:  
Urban power spoke the language of civil society and civil rights, rural power of 
community and culture. Civil power claimed to protect rights, customary power 
pledged to enforce tradition. The former was organized on the principle of 
differentiation to check the concentration of power, the latter around the principle 
of fusion to ensure a unitary authority. To grasp the relationship between the two, 
civil power and customary power, and between the language each employed – 
rights and custom, freedom and tradition – we need to consider them separately 
while keeping in mind that each signified one face of the same bifurcated state. 
(1996:18) 
Colonisers in cities, then, were citizens, that is, subjects of a discourse of civil rights, 
freedom and political representation, while rural Africans were subjects in several senses: 
being Foucault’s willing subjects of a rural customary discourse meant that they were 
subjected to traditions that had been perverted and despotised, its existing checks and 
balances removed by the colonial power together with even the appearance of the rule of 
law, and thus they were subjects in a third sense, Mamdani’s sense.   
 
Human rights, ethnic custom and the struggle for social justice in Africa 
But having placed the discourses of modernity and rights in opposition to that of co-opted 
traditional rural culture, Mamdani identifies a third type of subject: 
Between the rights-bearing colons and the subject peasantry was a third group: 
urban-based natives, mainly middle- and working-class persons, who were 
exempt from the lash of customary law but not from modern, racially 
discriminatory civil legislation. Neither subject to custom nor exalted as rights-
bearing citizens, they languished in a juridical limbo. (1996: 19) 
Thus there was no juridical, that is state-defined, discourse interpellating urban natives; 
they were the subjects of neither a customary rights nor a civil rights discourse, the two 
juridical institutions set up by the Janus-faced state. However this is not to say there was 
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no discourse interpellating them; discourses and the identities, or subjects, they 
interpellate and produce are not only politically and legally defined. As Laclau and 
Mouffe point out above, there are multiple discourses constantly interpellating 
individuals, whose subjectivities are consequently multifarious, or to use discursive 
terms, identities are decentred or overdetermined. To discover the nature of the main 
discourse that interpellated urban natives in the absence of a juridical one then, we need 
to follow Mamdani as he plots a trajectory for the development of African civil society. 
He does this by identifying four historical ‘moments’ in its relationship with the state, the 
first being this juridical limbo when ‘the colonial state [w]as the protector of the society 
of the colons’ (1996: 19). It was with the struggle for independence, Mamdani notes, that 
an indigenous civil society was born: 
The second moment in that development saw a marked shift in the relation 
between civil society and the state. This was the moment of the anticolonial 
struggle, for the anticolonial struggle was, at the same time a struggle of 
embryonic middle and working classes, the native strata in limbo, for entry into 
civil society. That entry, that expansion of civil society, was the result of an 
antistate struggle. Its consequence was the creation of an indigenous civil society. 
(1996: 19-20) 
Thus what interpellated urban natives was a struggle discourse, a struggle for social 
justice. Excluded and ‘othered’ by European despotism, refused the status of subjects of a 
citizen’s discourse and its concomitant chain of civil and political rights, they demanded 
entry into its centre. I argue that this struggle discourse, or social justice discourse, 
corresponds closely to the anatomy and physiology of Laclau’s populism, in that those 
engaged in the struggle for extra-juridical justice had necessarily to constitute themselves 
as ‘underdogs’ and the colonial state as the ‘enemy’; at this point it was not civil rights 
that was the enemy but the political dominance that excluded them from it.  
 
Redress and redistribution 
To return to Mamdani, his third moment is contextualised by independence and a 
deracialised state. Here he identifies Africanisation or, a phrase more familiar to South 
Africans, affirmative action, as the strategy adopted by newly independent and 
deracialised states in their attempt to deracialise their civil societies: 
 25
Independence tended to deracialize the state but not civil society. Instead, 
historically accumulated privilege, usually racial, was embedded and defended in 
civil society. Wherever the struggle to deracialize civil society reached 
meaningful proportions, the independent state played a central role. (1996: 20) 
 
Mamdani makes the important point that such a strategy on the part of the state had the 
effect of shifting the existing tension between the state and civil society (a crucial 
ingredient of Laclau’s populism dynamic) to tensions within civil society, as colonial 
beneficiaries, or ‘colons’, tried to defend their privilege, a point to which I return shortly. 
He then further analyses this third moment into two sub-moments, namely redress, or the 
dismantling of privilege, and redistribution, which he starkly rephrases as ‘corruption’. 
The effect of the first, he writes, was to unify the victims of colonial racism. ‘Not so the 
second [sub-moment], which turned around the question of redistribution and divided that 
same majority along lines that reflected the actual process of redistribution: regional, 
religious, ethnic, and at times just familial’ (1996: 20). We therefore have two sets of 
tensions:  first, ‘colons’ trying to hold on to the privileges they were used to, and second, 
a majority of poor people whose deprivations remained in place while a new elite was 
enriched and empowered through clan links, struggle links, clientelism and prebendalism. 
Enlarging on the former tension, Mamdani writes:  
Racial privilege not only receded into civil society, but defended itself in the 
language of civil rights, of individual rights and institutional autonomy. To 
victims of racism the vocabulary of rights rang hollow, a lullaby for perpetuating 
racial privilege. Their demands were formulated in the language of nationalism 
and social justice. The result was a breach between the discourse on rights and 
the one on justice, with the language of rights appearing as a fig leaf over 
privilege – power appearing as the guarantor of social justice and redress”. (1996: 
20-21, italics inserted)   
 
Thus the language of civil rights became tainted, part of Laclau’s ‘enemy’, while social 
justice could be won with struggle strategies such as the force of numbers, mob violence 
and ‘making the country ungovernable’. However, I argue that the breach Mamdani 
speaks of was not a dichotomy between rights and justice but a trichotomy; by now both 
the civil rights discourse and the ethnic discourse of clan loyalty and patronage were 
working in opposition to – or in Laclau’s terms, discursively constituted as the enemy of 
– the one of social justice, even while the historical tension between the first two 
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remained in place. In other words, the former victims of racism were now doubly 
constituted as victims, or Laclau’s underdogs; victims first of racism’s legacy and second 
of corrupt redistribution practices. 
 
For Mamdani this failure of redistribution to bring about social justice contextualised the 
fourth moment, which was characterised by the collapse of the embryonic indigenous 
civil society5 and its absorption into political society: ‘It is the time when civil society 
based social movements became demobilized and political movements statized’ (1996: 
21), or in other words, leading figures of the organised struggle took government 
positions. A partial example of this is Cosatu’s alliance with the ANC in government, 
although Cosatu still simultaneously at times mobilises in opposition to the state.  
 
Post-colonial South Africa 
However, Mamdani identifies some important differences between South Africa’s 
trajectory and its northern neighbours: 
The specificity of the South African experience lies in the strength of its civil 
society, both white and black … The strength of urban forces and civil society-
based movements in South Africa meant that unlike in most African countries, the 
center of gravity of popular struggle was in the townships and not against Native 
Authorities in the countryside. The depth of resistance in South Africa was rooted 
in urban-based worker and student resistance, not in the peasant revolt in the 
countryside. Whereas in most African countries the formation of an indigenous 
civil society was mainly a postindependence affair, following the deracialization 
of the state, in South Africa it is both cause and consequence of that deracialization.  
(1996: 29-30) 
Thus in South Africa the struggle itself was already partially deracialised; furthermore it 
was firmly rooted in the urban, rights-based discourse of students and workers. 
Consequently it is unsurprising that this civil rights discourse should operate powerfully 
within the new ANC-led government and its alliance partners, many of whose members 
were activists in the struggle. It is a government justifiably proud of a constitution that 
                                                 
5 Mamdani appears to be using these terms in a Gramscian sense, where political society stands for the 
coercive relations materialised in the various state institutions that bring about ‘direct domination’ while 
civil society comprises the ‘ensemble of organisms called private … apparatuses of hegemony’ such as 
churches, trade unions, political parties and cultural associations that make up the ruling class (Simon 1982: 
68-71, emphasis mine). 
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has been hailed internationally as one of the most progressive in the world, and of a 
history of struggling for universal human rights such as privacy, dignity, gender equality 
and freedom and speech as much as for liberation from the colonial yoke. Nonetheless, 
racial tension was and is present in South African society, particularly around equitable 
redistribution of previously racialised resources such as land, education and employment. 
In addition, like its neighbours, South Africa’s wealth has not flowed from its new 
government to its desperately poor majority, but to a new black elite. There is a third 
similarity between South Africa and its neighbours, which Mamdani underscores:  
It is precisely because black civil society in South Africa is that much stronger 
and more tenacious than any to the north that it illustrates dramatically the 
limitations of an exclusively civil society-based perspective as an anchor for a 
democratic movement: the urban uprising that unfolded in the wake of Durban 
1973 and Soweto 1976 lacked a perspective from which to understand and 
transcend the interethnic and the urban-rural tensions that would mark its way 
ahead. (1996: 31) 
His point is that post-independence Africa, including South Africa, did not fully 
democratise; power, and crucially, with it wealth, may have partly deracialised but it did 
not detribalise, in other words it did not dismantle the despotism set up and entrenched in 
colonially organised rural ethnic territories. Mamdani points out that the states that tried 
to detribalise did so through centralising power, something Mbeki has been accused of, 
particularly by Cosatu. Therefore both forms of despotism (centralism and tribalism), in 
democratic South Africa at least I would argue, jostle one another in the wings, while 
further north, according to Mamdani, one form of despotism was simply replaced by 
another.  To summarise the argument made above, there is not the Manichean duality of 
modern and tribal discourses, civil rights and customary ones; rather there are three 
intertwined discourses: civil or human rights, customary rights and social justice. Clearly 
the relationships between the three are complexly interwoven. What follows below and in 
Chapter Four, therefore, is a closer look at the texture and quality of these three 
discourses, who they interpellated and the way they operated in the public’s responses to 
Zuma’s rape trial, both in relation to each other and in relation to power; in other words 
whether they work to challenge or to reinforce the status quo.  
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Human rights, ethnic custom and social justice in South Africa 
Viewed through Laclau’s lens of populism, Mamdani’s ‘social justice’ discourse, then, 
constitutes its subjects as ‘underdogs’ and constitutes whatever power is frustrating their 
demands as ‘the enemy’.  In his inaugural lecture at the University of Cape Town (1998), 
Mamdani elaborates on both the breach between civil rights and social justice in a 
specifically South African context, and on the nature, or quality, of the ethnic and rights 
discourses. I deal with the latter first.  
 
Taking the citizen-subject framework outlined above as his point of departure, Mamdani 
shifts focus to a mutually constitutive dichotomy between settler and native identities in 
the post-colonial state, making the point that the split is a political one as distinct from a 
cultural one; that is, the two sets of identities are juridical, defined and entrenched by the 
state as part of the colonial legacy, or to be more specific, a result of the newly 
deracialised state’s failure to dismantle customary power organised into ethnic pockets:  
Natives were said to belong, not to any civic space, but to an ethnic space. The 
native identity was not defined by where he or she was born or lived, but by his or 
her ancestral area. That area, in turn, was defined ethnically: you belonged to your 
ethnic area. You were obliged to follow the customs of your ethnic group. Your 
rights and obligations were defined by your custom, and that custom was enforced 
as a ‘customary’ law, by a Native Authority, whose seat was the local state. The 
local state spoke the language of culture, not rights. (1998: 1) 
 
‘Settlers’, in contrast, were by definition rootless and homeless, forever wandering; they 
had citizens’ rights but were without the second set of rights afforded to ‘natives’ via 
their ethnic, customary identity; one which was intensely geographical but a geography 
inextricable from history: your ‘real’ home was the place your ancestors were buried. 
 
The class question 
 Mamdani underscores this distinction with the important point that it is poor natives who 
benefit most from their customary subjectivity because through it they have access to 
land: ‘We need to recognize a class question here… The rich could buy land anywhere. 
So the poor came to have a better sense of ethnic belonging, of who belonged and who 
didn’t, than did the rich’ (1998: 1). Thus an ethnic discourse could on the one hand be 
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partly responsible for continued poverty after independence by enriching and privileging 
a new elite, and on the other hand, offer protection to the most vulnerable at a local level. 
 
Mamdani makes a second important distinction between customary rights and civic ones: 
Civic rights continued to be defined as individual rights in the civil and  
political sphere. In contrast, customary rights were defined as a group right,  
one you accessed by virtue of belonging to an ethnic group. The domain of 
customary rights was not as much civil and political, as it was cultural and 
economic. (1998: 1) 
 
In short, we have indigenous subjects, many of them still suffering extreme deprivation 
as a result of colonialism, which had brought with it a European, liberal discourse of 
human rights. As a group therefore, they have no historical reason to believe that 
individual, civil rights, accessible only to an already empowered and educated elite 
through expensive legal processes and structures, could ever equate with social justice, 
that is, equitable distribution of resources. On the other hand, the democratic, popularly 
elected governments which replaced the colonial yoke have generally embraced a 
neoliberal capitalist discourse encompassing individual rights and, to varying extents, 
eschewed the customary discourse as a colonial tool or, as in South Africa, 
uncomfortably tried to accommodate it alongside, but subject to, the civil rights discourse 
while simultaneously apportioning wealth and power among a select cabal.  
 
Enlarging on the political extent to which a hegemonic neoliberal discourse of individual 
human rights can silence one of social justice, Neocosmos writes: 
If rights discourse contributes to the maintenance of privilege for the privileged 
… [t]he whole system … has the effect of excluding the majority from official 
state politics on the one hand, while making it difficult if not impossible for them 
to mobilise politically on the other … It leads to the complete antithesis of an 
active citizenship which is the necessary basis of democracy. Citizenship is 
simply reduced to the possession of state documents which entitle the majority to 
engage in politics at most once every five years or so. (Neocosmos 2004: 223) 
Rephrasing this neoliberal domination in economic terms, Neocosmos suggests that 
capitalism presents a problem specific to Africa, ‘where the social grievances which 
fuelled the national liberation struggle such as access to land, jobs, greater social equality 
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among classes, races and genders seem incapable of redress’. The free market system and 
its attendant individualistic liberalism are, he writes, ‘incapable of addressing these issues 
of social justice’ (2004: 224).  
Neocosmos, intentionally or otherwise, evokes a classic Marxist class antagonism, that is 
a powerless underclass and a ruling elite determined to hold on to its privilege. Mangcu 
speaks succinctly to this antagonism in the context of Zuma and his supporters, writing of 
the temptation to dismiss those with whom we disagree as ‘irrational’: 
It is a seductiveness deeply rooted in pre-existing stereotypes and anxieties about 
the masses. Over the years we have created a house of cards talking about how 
wonderfully inclusive our country has become, pretending that all was well with 
the natives. And now that the natives are restless, we feign indignation and say 
they have “issues”. You bet they have “issues”. You and I and the endangered 
precious minorities are the “issues” ... we monopolise the privileges of freedom, 
and insult them as stupid when they tell us so ... We have always known that, in 
the words of political theorist Ernesto Laclau, “there is in any society a reservoir 
of raw anti-status quo feelings which crystallise in some symbols (read Jacob 
Zuma)”. (Business Day 28 Sep 06) 
Mangcu has identified a middle class and elite horror of unruly mobs associated with an 
underclass whose demands are not met. In an earlier article Mangcu accuses elements of 
the media, the voice of the privileged, of fanning this antagonism by ‘mobilisation of elite 
bias’:  
 [journalist Achille Mbembe, writing in City Press and Sunday Times] builds his 
argument by appealing to the basest of elite stereotypes, which is a picture of 
marauding gangs driven more by passion than reason. He paints a picture of Zuma 
the antimodern, anti-Christ, threatening the cosmopolitan embodiment of 
modernity, Thabo Mbeki. Through this deployment of historical fiction the 
individuals and organisations that support Zuma are no longer political agents in a 
political debate but delusional mobs fitting the description of a millenarian, 
eschatological movement. (Business Day 8 June 06) 
 
In Chapter Four I investigate whether the Sowetan appeals to these ‘elite stereotypes’ and 
represents Zuma’s supporters as unreasoning ‘marauding gangs’ and ‘delusional mobs’.  
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Mamdani warns post-apartheid South Africans of the ‘limits to which the non-racial 
language of rights can be effective… once it has become illegitimate in the eyes of the 
native majority’:  
 
In native ears, rights-talk increasingly sounded like a defense of settler privilege, 
and justice a language to articulate native grievance. Part of the lesson of the 
Uganda Asian experience is that the denial of justice bred a wave of popular 
discontent, a wave a demagogue rode to power. The story of Idi Amin Dada has 
been racialized and told over and again, as that of an anthropological oddity. To 
be meaningful, it needs to be retold as the story of an unaddressed social 
grievance that could be harvested by a demagogue. (2005: 8) 
 
Idi Amin, in other words, capitalised on the existing conditions which in Laclau’s terms 
are necessary for a ‘populist rupture’ – a history of long-frustrated social demands.   
Laclau has made it clear that a populist discourse expediently deploys whatever other 
discourses are resonant in the society at the time, including those of the apparently 
oppositional civil and customary rights, in any combination that makes utopian promises 
of equitable redistribution seem possible. In this study, we will see in Chapter Four how 
Zuma supporters call on their constitutional rights in the same breath as invoking their 
ancestors through traditional rites such as burning impepho (incense), how posters 
inscribed with democratic slogans were juxtaposed with those threatening civil war, how 
rights-based organisations like Cosatu could condone threats to the life of a woman who 
challenged a politically and tribally powerful male and how a government proud of its 
citizens’ right to free speech allowed public protest to become hate speech and incitement 
to violence. Here is a deeper layer of explanation for the disparity of the groupings 
unified by their support for Zuma: a Zulu yet high in the structures of a party that has 
yielded two Xhosa presidents; rich, powerful and urbane yet from a poor, rural and ethnic 
background, he was constructed as Mbeki’s Other, everything Mbeki is not, and therefore 
on him was pinned the hope of providing what Mbeki had not – social justice. 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have constructed a framework for a critical discourse analysis of some of 
the South African public’s responses to Zuma’s rape trial as represented by the Sowetan. 
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Grounded in Foucault’s conceptualisation of power as circulating at all levels of society, I 
have outlined the post-structuralist discourse theory of Laclau and Mouffe in which 
interpellation of subjects by discourses that contest for hegemony are key concepts for 
the understanding of identity construction. This theory contextualises a discussion of 
populism that functions discursively to construct power along pre-Foucauldian and 
Marxist lines, or in other words as repressive and concentrated in the state, and as 
something that needs to be wrested from the state through a popular rupture (Simon 1982: 
72). These concepts are then placed in a post-colonial African context with Mamdani’s 
path-breaking identification of civil rights, customary and social justice discourses.  
In a survey of post-Marxist work in South Africa, Bertoldi and Van Zyl, discussing 
Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory, write: ‘post-Marxists aim to identify different 
discursive conditions for the emergence of collective action. They ask how political 
identities are constituted, and how relations of oppression are constituted out of relations 
of subordination’ (1998: 36). Bertoldi and Van Zyl add that attempts to apply the work of 
Laclau and Mouffe to the South African situation have provided ‘few, if any, interesting 
or new insights’ (1998: 44).  
In a similar survey of post-colonial academia in South Africa, Leroke notes that among 
the concerns of post-colonialist scholarship are representation, Marxist critique, the 
power/knowledge relationship and, like post-Marxists, identity formation. However, it is 
distinguished by its ‘fascination with the other’ in identity formation; in fact ‘It can be 
said to be the study of othemess’ (1998:58-61). I hope, therefore, to make a small 
contribution to South African post-Marxist and post-colonial research by analysing the 
articulatory social practices that took place around Zuma’s rape trial as the two contesting 
positions, pro- and anti-Zuma, deployed three discourses of civil rights, ethnic tradition 
and social justice in their attempts to invalidate and ‘Other’ one another, vying to invest 
various nodal points with their own chains of equivalence, variously forming alliances 
and setting up antagonisms in different combinations. 
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CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY 
 
Introduction 
Certain events occur in social and political worlds that serve as catalysts, bringing to the 
fore discourses and undercurrents that may otherwise have remained dormant. The Zuma 
trial and its unprecedented contestation between his supporters and those of the rape 
complainant outside the courtroom is one such event, and so to examine media texts 
related to it is in effect both a socio-cultural critique and a form of media analysis. 
 
This study focuses on pictures of protests outside the courtroom and letters to the editor, 
thus deliberately excluding the news reports and commentary by professional journalists.  
The rationale behind this focus is to try to isolate the ‘voices’ of the public included in 
the pages of the Sowetan. It also allows for a clearer analysis of how the Sowetan has 
framed these contestations. The analysis takes on a double-pronged task. On the one hand 
it explores how seemingly contradictory discourses such as ethnic traditionalism, social 
justice and human rights were operationalised and articulated within the contestations 
that took place in the public domain. On the other hand, it examines the Sowetan’s role in 
mediating class, tradition/modernity and gender issues for its readers.  Thus it is a socio-
cultural critique anchored to an analysis of a selected set of texts.  
 
 
Research question 
The research question that drives the study is:  ‘How are the ‘voices’ of citizens 
responding to the Zuma rape trial constructed and mediated in the Sowetan?’. To explore 
this question, I first use thematic content analysis to extract broad themes running 
through the material (the newspaper’s pictures of the protests outside the courtroom and 
letters to its editor concerning the trial) before conducting a critical discourse analysis. 
The study is located within a theoretical framework that identifies three wider discourses 
of traditional ethnicity, human rights and social justice as informing both the localised 
contestation between Zuma’s supporters and those of his rape accuser, and the Sowetan’s 
mediation of it. 
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Content analysis is generally seen as a quantitative method stemming from a positivist, 
scientistic tradition of research although its offspring, thematic content analysis, while yet 
remaining true to its roots, has a more subjective, interpretive dimension as I explain later 
in this chapter. It is a form of qualitative content analysis, which has been developed in 
the past few decades in disciplines such as psychology and anthropology specifically for 
its ability to explore meanings underlying messages in large aggregates of text (Zhang 
2006: 1). Critical discourse analysis, on the other hand, is a qualitative method situated 
firmly within a critical research paradigm, which has an overtly emancipatory agenda 
(Smaling 1994: 235; Huckin 1995: 16, Deacon et al. 1999: 13; Morgan 2002: 3). Below I 
outline some of the theoretical considerations arising from my choice of such a hybrid 
research design. 
 
Methodological considerations 
Three broad paradigms (or in other words, a ‘constellation of beliefs, norms and values 
that guide scientific research’ (Smaling: 1994: 234)), or frameworks for thinking about 
human behaviour, are loosely discernible in social science enquiry, namely an empirical, 
an interpretive and a critical one, and although they are separated by significant 
philosophical (epistemological, ontological and axiological) differences, this need not 
imply that they are incompatible (Smaling 1994: 233-237). In fact the lines between 
them, both epistemologically and methodologically, have become increasingly blurred 
(Bryman 1984: 75-90; Hardy & Bryman 2004: 547-565; Deacon et al. 1999: 114-5).  
 
Moreover, while quantitative (counting, statistical) research methods were once linked 
exclusively with the empirical, positivist, scientistic paradigm and qualitative methods 
with the interpretive (while critical researchers used both (Smaling 1994: 241; Deacon et 
al. 1999: 11)), there is a growing acceptance that research designs that simply apply the 
most appropriate method for a specific purpose can often bring the strengths of each 
approach to bear. Pool, for example, asserts: ‘it should not be assumed that qualitative 
methods are insightful, and quantitative ones merely mechanical methods for checking 
                                                 
6 As this is a paper in an unpaginated on-line journal, I use page numbers as established on a downloaded 
copy.  
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hypotheses. The relationship is a circular one; each provides new insights on which the 
other can feed’ (1959:192, quoted in Holsti: 1969: 12). Forty years later, Deacon et al. 
echo this point: ‘The use of more than one analytical method has the advantage that the 
weaknesses of any single method, qualitative or quantitative, are balanced by the 
strengths of other methods’ (1999: 114).  Hansen et al. are more specific about these 
strengths and weaknesses, stating that the weakness of ‘positivist’ methods like content 
analysis is their lack of theory while they can bring a ‘methodological rigour’ otherwise 
lacking to more qualitative approaches (1998: 91.  
 
Deacon et al. make a useful distinction when they state that what separates interpretive 
research from positivism is not whether figures are referred to but how they are used: 
‘Positivists look to statistics to answer research questions. Interpretive researchers see 
them as a source of questions, a springboard for further investigation and analysis’ (1999: 
9) and Smaling asserts that choice of method is seldom paradigmatic, that is influenced 
by a researcher’s preferred views of humanity and ideologies alone. Methods are also 
chosen for pragmatic reasons, including the question of how best to answer the research 
question (1994: 245). It is these considerations that led to a research design that straddles 
all three paradigms. Thematic content analysis was seen as the best way of gaining a 
broad overview of the material and extracting some major themes, because its aim, in 
Deacon et al.’s words, is to ‘produce a ‘big picture’ by delineating trends and patterns 
over large aggregates of texts (1999: 117).  
Critical discourse analysis has a completely different aim. As implied by the phrase 
‘emancipatory agenda’ used above, its users do not strive, as positivist researchers do, for 
‘objectivity’ through rigorous counts, or for reliability and validity through documenting 
reproducible experiments. Rather, in Huckin’s words, it is a ‘highly context-sensitive, 
democratic approach which takes an ethical stance on social issues with the aim of 
improving society’ (1995:1). There is no pretension to objectivity, then; it is research 
with an agenda. Huckin explicates this ‘ethical stance’ as one that:  
Draws attention to power imbalances, social inequities, non-democratic practices, 
and other injustices in hopes of spurring readers to corrective action. This is why 
 36
the term critical is used: critical discourse analysis not only describes unfair 
social/political practices but is explicitly critical of them. (1995: 2) 
This study, then, first uses thematic content analysis in order to gain a ‘common-sense, 
descriptive sweep of content’ (Wilbraham 1995: 2) before turning to a method that, 
through close textual and semiotic analysis, may help to explicate some of the power 
imbalances that became apparent during the South African public’s contestations over 
Jacob Zuma’s rape trial. Below, I discuss first how I conducted the thematic content 
analysis and second, how I went about the critical discourse analysis. 
 
Methods 
Thematic content analysis 
Zhang (2006: 1) offers two definitions of qualitative content analysis, namely:  ‘[a] 
research method for the subjective interpretation of the content of text data through the 
systematic classification process of coding and identifying themes or patterns’ (Hsieh and 
Shannon, 2005:1278) and second, ‘An approach of empirical, methodological[ly] 
controlled analysis of texts within their context of communication, following content 
analytic rules and step by step models, without rash quantification’ (Mayring, 2000:5). 
 
The definitions, Zhang points out, emphasise that the method allows researchers to 
interpret social reality in a ‘subjective but scientific manner ... qualitative content analysis 
goes beyond merely counting words or extracting objective content from texts to examine 
themes and patterns that appear or are latent in the manifest content’ (2006: 1). 
 
Similarly, Bryman notes that qualitative content analysis ‘comprises a searching-out of 
underlying themes in the materials being analyzed’ (2004: 392 in Kohlbacher 2005: 9). 
He defines qualitative content analysis as: 
An approach to documents that emphasizes the role of the investigator in the 
construction of the meaning of and in texts. There is an emphasis on allowing 
categories to emerge out of data and on recognizing the significance for 
understanding the meaning of the context in which an item being analyzed (and the 
categories derived from it) appeared. (2004: 542 in Kohlbacher 2005: 9) 
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What the three definitions have in common is an emphasis on subjective interpretation 
and an emphasis on seeing the material in its context, both departures from classical 
content analysis so fundamental that they push thematic content analysis out of the 
positivist paradigm and into the interpretivist one. 
 
However, the step-by-step scientific rigour of the method is also emphasised, and 
concomitantly the literature abounds with ‘recipes’ for conducting a thematic content 
analysis. Hansen et al. (1998: 98-99) for example, outlines a series of rather inscrutable 
steps: 1) define the research problem; 2) select media and sample; 3) define analytical 
categories; 4) construct coding schedule; 5) pilot coding schedule and check reliability; 6) 
prepare data and analyse. Zhang (2000: 2-5), while skipping Hansen et al.’s first stage 
and advising a little more comprehensively on the final stages, presents a basically 
similar schema: 1) Arrange the data; 2) Decide unit of analysis; 3) Develop categories 
and coding scheme; 4) Test coding on sample; 5) Code all text; 6) Access coding 
consistency; 7) Draw conclusions; 8) Report.  
 
Mayring’s (2000:12) formula for the crucial ‘development of categories and coding’ 
stage is more helpful: 1) Inductive category development; 2) Summarising; 3) Context 
analysis; 4) Deductive category application. Enlarging on inductive category 
development, he advises the researcher to be guided by both the theory and the research 
question, and to develop the first tentative categories deductively before revising them in 
‘feedback loops’ (that presumably correspond with Hansen et al.’s stage 5 and Zhang’s 
stage 4) and that eventually lead to reducing them to main categories. His ‘deductive 
category application’ stage is where category definitions and coding rules for inclusion 
and exclusion are explicated, preferably with examples. 
 
Mayring offers sound advice in another area: while his concern is with preserving the 
positivist strengths of content analysis such as its replicability (and thus reliability) he 
also emphasises that the method is flexible and adaptable, and advises that the researcher 
be guided in this respect primarily by the research question and the nature of the material 
(2000: 13).  Having stated my research question above as well as my aim in conducting 
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the thematic content analysis then, I therefore structure my discussion according to the 
following: 1) Sampling and data collection (what Hansen et al. calls ‘media selection and 
sample’ and Zhang terms ‘arranging data’); 2) category development; and briefly, 3) 
reliability issues. 
 
• Sampling and data collection  
I focus on the Sowetan’s coverage of the trial, partly because it is one of only two 
national daily newspapers in South Africa with an English-literate black target 
readership, and partly because it is based in Johannesburg, where the trial took place.  
As mentioned in Chapter One, the Sowetan currently has a relatively large average daily 
readership of 1.6 million. In spite of its tabloid format, it has a history of human rights 
activism and a middleclass target readership, as opposed to its rival national daily tabloid, 
The Sun’s working class one.  
 
I established the research material through a search of the Sowetan’s electronic archives, 
which as a Johnnic staff member I have access to through the company database.  Using 
the keywords Zuma and rape, the electronic search yielded about 400 items between 1 
January and 21 June 2006 including photographs, cartoons, news, analysis, editorial 
comment and letters from the public. Considering the scope of this study7, it seemed that 
the sample would be more than adequate, since the keywords would ensure a reasonable 
level of representivity and the date parameters spanned the crucial period of the study, 
that is, the full duration of the trial (February 13 to May 8 2006) plus six weeks before 
and after. 
 
Having narrowed my focus to the public’s response to the trial as discussed above, I then 
constructed two tables, one of all the pictures of protests outside the court (25 items) and 
one of all the letters concerning the trial (50 items). I used identifiers such as date, page, 
headline (or caption and tagline for the pictures). I summarized the main points in the 
letters, and entered denotative descriptions of pictures. Both tables were marked for 
direction (pro- or anti-Zuma letters, or in the case of the pictures, representations of pro- 
                                                 
7 This mini-thesis fulfills 35% of the Masters degree’s requirements 
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or anti-Zuma demonstrators). These tables are submitted as Appendices 1 and 2 
respectively. 
 
• Category development 
Each letter and each picture was treated as a unit of analysis. Immersing myself first in 
the letters, I began by identifying the issues and concerns that seemed to recur most 
frequently.  These were Mayring’s ‘first tentative categories’, derived directly from the 
material, or what Piantanida et al. refer to as ‘first tier’ or substantive codes ‘still closely 
tied to the idiosyncrasies of the situation’ (2004:339). As most theorists agree, thematic 
content analysis has ‘fuzzier boundaries’ than classical content analysis because each 
protocol (in this case, letter) can carry many themes (Zhang: 3; Wilbraham: 1).  This was 
indeed the case, as can be seen from the difference between the ‘issue’ and ‘letter’ totals 
in the table below.  At one stage, a summarised table of these looked like this: 
 
Issue ProZuma: 
16 letters 
AntiZuma: 
34 letters 
TOTAL LETTERS: 
50 
Let judge decide 12 9 21 
Liberation struggle 
(social justice) 
7 7 14 
Succession 4 13 17 
 Protesters’ behaviour 6 16 22 
JZ Bad Example  
• During trial 
• On night of incident 
  
13 
16 
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Patriarchal position 7  7 
Women rights position  16 16 
Complainant 5 11 16 
Role of media 5 3 8 
TOTAL ISSUES: 150 46 issues 104 issues  
 
Table 1: First tier categories summary: issues in letters to the editor 
 
I emphasise that this was only one stage of the categorising process, which stretched over 
more than a year; there are many versions of this table. Having coded the letters, the next 
stage was looking for relationships between issues and trying to see what the pro-Zuma 
letters had in common as opposed to what the anti-Zuma letters had in common, as well 
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what the two groups had in common. In other words there was a process of collapsing 
issues and concerns into broader and broader categories that eventually became four 
overarching themes, namely gender, succession, supporters’ behaviour and the role of the 
media (See Appendix 4 and Chart 1 in Chapter Four). This process of clustering 
substantive codes based on related characteristics, described by Piantanida et al. as a 
‘recursive spiraling between iterative and conceptual interpretation’ (2004: 340) is what 
eventually leads to Mayring’s ‘main categories’.  It is both a humbling and a frustrating 
process if one has any illusions that positivist ‘objectivity’ is possible. Be that as it may, 
these were my final categories:  
 
Theme Pro-Zuma Anti-Zuma TOTAL THEMES: 
Gender 9 19 28 
Supporters 4 14 18 
Succession 3 10 13 
Media 5 3 8 
THEME TOTAL:     67 
    
Media-Gender 1  1 
Media-Succession 2 1 3 
Succession-Gender 1 1 2 
Supporters-Gender 1 8 9 
Supporters-Media 1  1 
 
Table 2: Second tier categories summary: themes in letters to the editor 
 
As some letters addressed more than one theme, the second half of the table (in italics) 
shows letters with mixed themes. Thus for example the twelve instances where gender is 
discussed together with another theme (one media, two succession, nine supporters) are 
part of the theme total of twenty-eight for gender in the top half of the table. (As noted 
above and in Chapter Four, the total refers to themes, while the letter total is 50.) Chart 1 
in Chapter Four is therefore sourced only from the top half of this table, although in the 
critical discourse analysis I look carefully at the way the themes interact with each other.  
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Another way I tried looking at the material was chronologically, to see if these themes 
developed and changed over time, and whether letters responded to the news events 
recorded by the pictures (see Appendix 3 and Chart 2 in Chapter Four). They did, but 
nonetheless I decided to structure the critical discourse analysis in Chapter Four 
according to the four themes rather than adopt a chronological approach. The rationale 
was that, although the public did respond to the events as they unfolded, those responses 
must necessarily have been informed by values and subjectivities that relate to wider 
ideological discourses such as the ones of social justice, human rights and ethnic tradition 
as argued in Chapter Two. These inform the critical discourse analysis of the localised 
contestation and the strategies deployed by the two camps in their discursive struggle for 
hegemony.  
 
So far I have discussed the thematic content analysis largely in relation to the letters, and 
how the identification of the four themes that structure the analysis in Chapter Four is 
arrived at. Working with the pictures, I used the database less and engaged more with 
hard copies of the pages. This was because a far more semiotic approach was required; 
although in one sense I analyse pictures as entities in their own right I also place them in 
the context of the page in order to see more holistically what messages the Sowetan 
presented.  Here I still engaged in constant classification and comparison to allow themes 
like ‘order/disorder’, ‘diversity in the groupings’ and ‘women displaying ethnic 
performance’ to emerge, and these also structure a part of Chapter Four.  
 
One major limitation of the semiotic aspect of the analysis is that my copies of the pages 
were black and white, thus excluding the powerful element of colour.  However, analysis 
of such complexities would have extended this study way beyond its required and hence 
limited scope. 
 
• Reliability and validity 
I must point out that no detailed coding schedule is presented here, because the bulk of 
the concluding and reporting work (Zhang’s stages 7 and 8) are done through critical 
discourse analysis, discussed below. However the consistency of the decisions made in 
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assigning themes to letters (or letters to themes) will hopefully be clear from examining 
Appendix 2, the table of summarised letters. All the pages with pictures analysed are 
appendixed, as well as one letters page which is discussed in terms of page design. 
 
Critical discourse analysis 
Critical discourse analysis is a contemporary approach to the study of language 
and discourses in social institutions. Drawing on poststructuralist discourse theory 
and critical linguistics, it focuses on how social relations, identity, knowledge and 
power are constructed through written and spoken texts. (Luke 1997: 50)  
 
The above definition of critical discourse analysis echoes Huckin’s assertion referred to  
earlier in the chapter that critical discourse analysis is concerned primarily with analysing 
texts of various sorts to expose the dynamics of power relations in the social world. In my 
analysis, I draw mainly on Laclau & Mouffe (1985) for a theory of discourse. However, 
as Phillips and Jorgensen point out, because Laclau and Mouffe’s aim was theory 
development, their discourse theory is ‘short on specific methodological guidelines and 
illustrative examples’ (2002: 8) and does not include many ‘practical tools for textually 
oriented discourse analysis’. As a result, they advise, ‘it can be fruitful to supplement 
their theory with methods from other approaches to discourse analysis’ (2002: 24). 
Huckin, too, notes that critical discourse analysts differ among themselves in the kinds of 
tools they employ: ‘[They] do not all focus on exactly the same kinds of text features ...  
there is no standardized form of critical discourse analysis methodology’ (1995: 5).  
Having outlined the concepts he uses to teach critical discourse analysis to second-
language English students, he cautions:  
It is important to emphasize that the concepts just described are meant to be 
used selectively, not exhaustively. Critical discourse analysis is an approach, a 
way of looking at texts, not a rigorously systematic method of analysis … a 
critical discourse analyst should use his or her best judgment as to which 
concepts are most appropriate to an insightful understanding of the text at 
hand. (2002: 12, emphasis in original) 
 
I therefore synthesised the method I use to conduct the analysis in Chapter Four; one that 
encompasses my theoretical framework, which is located within the body of post-Marxist 
and post-colonial African literature, thereby indicating that the study is underpinned by 
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questions of identity construction, class, gender and other power relations. The three 
keystones of this framework are, first, concepts from Laclau & Mouffe’s (1985) theory of 
meaning, which assumes a power struggle between contesting discourses seeking to 
invalidate one another and to either challenge or support existing hegemonies in the way 
they construct identities through organising chains of meaning around nodal points; 
second, Laclau’s (2005) theorisation of populism, which assumes that diverse groupings 
can unite under a demagogue’s banner and dichotomise the social space in shared 
antagonism towards existing power, and third, concepts from Mamdani’s (1996; 1998) 
theorisation of power and resistance in Africa, which explicates three overarching 
ideological discourses of social justice, human rights and traditional ethnic practices.   
 
Huckin8 (1995; 2002) advocates four levels, or layers, of increasingly ‘microscopic’ 
examination, beginning with the social context, then approaching the text as a whole 
before examining it sentence by sentence and finally at phrase and word level. At each 
stage certain concepts, or analytical tools, come into play. The social context layer, or 
‘higher level’ of analysis, involves discursive processes and broader, more general 
concepts than those used in close textual examination. At the ‘whole text’ level he 
examines issues around genre, framing (including visual aids), foregrounding, 
omission and presupposition. At sentence level he looks at how strategies like 
transitivity, topicalisation, insinuation, presupposition and deletion work to 
foreground or background agency (who exerts power). At word and phrase level he 
examines issues of connotation, register and modality. Below I discuss how certain 
aspects of these first two levels inform the study, while the second two levels of close 
textual examination are the subject of Chapter Four.  
 
• Social context level 
In Chapter Two I identified three discourses at play in the Sowetan’s representation of the 
public’s responses to Zuma’s rape trial, one extra-juridical and two juridical. These are, 
                                                 
8 In introducing these levels Huckin acknowledges Fairclough’s (1992) three-dimensional model for 
conducting a critical discourse analysis, which similarly places the text (first dimension) in the context of 
its discursive practices of production and interpretation (second dimension) and these in turn in the wide 
socio-political context of the third dimension. 
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first, the discourse of struggle for social justice which, with its historical links to African 
struggles against colonial and apartheid governments, is extra-juridical. According to 
Laclau’s criteria it would rate high on a populist scale since it interpellates as its subjects 
a frustrated underclass with a range of diverse demands linked only by their subjects’ 
antagonistic relationship with the political power.  
 
Second, we have two juridical or state-defined discourses, although both have extra-
juridical undercurrents. First is a neoliberal, individualistic human rights discourse 
associated on the one hand, paradoxically again with the South African liberation 
movement (paradoxical since it is (now) juridical, institutionalised, and thus intrinsically 
inimical to the extra-juridical one described above). The struggle movement placed a 
range of juridical rights, including gender rights, at the centre of its struggle for justice, 
and consequently this discourse is strongly linked with the current government, which 
wrote and enshrined the constitution. Yet on the other hand, according to Mamdani and 
Neocosmos, the human rights discourse is tainted with retention of privilege, because its 
individualistic nature links it to the Western legal system which offers little recourse for 
class- or gender-based historical injustices, or to the poor and ill-educated (Mamdani 
1996: 20-21; Neocosmos 2004: 223-4, See Chapter Two).  
 
The second juridical discourse is a customary/traditional/ ethnic discourse, validated by 
the state and the constitution. It is associated with, on the one hand, patronage and clan 
loyalties that created a new, post-liberation privileged class and on the other hand, 
paradoxically can provide security for the poor and vulnerable. Thus while both the 
juridical discourses can be constituted as institutional, in other words inimical to the 
‘underdog’ subjects of Laclau’s populist social justice discourse, they can also both at 
times be appropriated as the protector of the ‘underdog’.  
 
In Chapter Four, I examine how these three discourses were inscribed in various 
combinations in line with contesting interests. This entails using Laclau & Mouffe’s 
concepts to analyse the articulatory social practices that took place around Zuma’s rape 
trial as the two contesting positions, pro- and anti-Zuma, deployed the three discourses of 
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social justice, civil rights and ethnic tradition in different combinations to invest various 
‘nodal points’ with their own chains of equivalence, in their attempts to invalidate and 
‘other’ one another.  
 
• Whole text level 
Huckin notes that texts ‘manifest a characteristic set of formal features serving a 
characteristic purpose’ according to their genre, or ‘text type’ (1995: 6). The texts I 
consider are letters to the Sowetan on the one hand and on the other, the newspaper’s 
visual representations of the protests outside the court during Zuma’s rape trial, as they 
record the way people made messages including posters, T-shirts, dress and body 
performances.   
 
As a genre, letters to the editor are, I argue, part of a neo-liberal, human rights-based 
discourse that constructs the media as a fourth estate, as a Habermasian public sphere that 
functions, in the words of James Curran, as a ‘space between government and society in 
which private individuals exercise … informal control [over the state] through the 
pressure of public opinion’ (1997: 122). Thus the leader page, where letters are 
published, is a forum for reasoned debate, for arguing points and listening to others, even 
conflicting ones, in the best liberal fashion. As well argued elsewhere (see for example 
Schudson 2000: 194, and proponents of the political economy school such as Herman & 
Chomsky 1988), such a view of the press presupposes an informed and literate aggregate 
of citizens, a public secure in its individual civil rights such as freedom of speech, whose 
opinions carry weight with the state; in short, a wealthy middle class. 
 
The language of protest as a genre, on the other hand, is always already at odds with the 
system; by its very nature it speaks from a place of marginalisation to a perceived 
injustice dished out from an inimical, repressive, top-down power. This is the discourse 
of Mamdani’s social justice and of Laclau’s populism, where every mass-based public 
protest is to some degree a ‘populist rupture’ in which ‘underdogs’ demand social justice 
from a reluctant or ineffectual political dominance.  In this study, the genre is presented 
photographically and the pictures are then anchored by the Sowetan through captions. 
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The protesters are frequently clearly aware of the camera, and consciously enact 
scenarios before it in order to ensure their statements, whether articulated on posters, in 
dress, ritual or action, are disseminated via the lens to TV and newspaper audiences. Thus 
the theatre outside the courtroom becomes a platform for both sets of protesters  to 
articulate their disparate voices and ‘demands’ in various combinations under the nodal 
point, or catalyst, of Zuma as his identity, and concomitantly that of his complainant, is 
contested. 
 
I deal with issues of framing (including visual cues such as page design), 
foregrounding, omission and presupposition extensively in Chapter Four and Five, 
and therefore will not enlarge on them here. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: ANALYSIS 
 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter I begin with an overview of the material based on a rudimentary thematic 
content analysis. This discussion allows the emergence of four themes. As explained in 
Chapter Three, I structure the critical discourse analysis that follows according to these 
themes rather than adopt a chronological approach. This is because, although the public 
did respond to events as they unfolded, these responses must necessarily have been 
informed by an existing set of values and subjectivities that have been constructed, as 
argued in Chapter Two, by prevailing (and contesting) discourses such as the ones of 
social justice, human rights and ethnic tradition.  
 
What follows then, is a brief chronological overview of the material to show how the 
themes emerged. To conduct the close critical reading, I then take each theme by turn, 
discussing first pictures, then anti-Zuma letters and finally pro-Zuma letters in terms of 
the themes. In conclusion, I draw together the threads that have emerged to look at how 
the two contesting positions have formed equivalential chains of meaning around the 
identities of Zuma and his complainant. 
 
Thematic content analysis: Overview of letters and pictures 
Of the 50 letters concerning Zuma’s rape trial published in the Sowetan between January 
and June 2006, thirty five, or 70 percent, express positions that are critical of him while 
only fifteen are supportive of him.  On the other hand, in the Sowetan’s visual portrayals 
of the two sets of opposing supporters outside court, the numerical domination is in the 
other camp, the pro-Zuma position. Of the 25 pictures, 21 of them, or a full 84 percent, 
are representations of Zuma’s supporters and only four are of the anti-rape and HIV-Aids 
activists.  This may be our first indication of a class division in the public’s response to 
Zuma’s rape trial, an observation we will test and monitor throughout this study. 
 
There are no pictures in January. Of the 50 letters, a mere four were written in January 
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when the selection of the judge was being decided. The split between the contesting pro- 
and anti-Zuma positions is equal, with two expressing a patriarchal position with regard 
to women and two criticising  Zuma’s behaviour.  Between 14 and 16 February, the 
Sowetan covered both the preliminary hearing in news stories as well as the scenes 
outside court through the medium of photographs. Of the six pictures of scenes outside 
court, only one is of anti-rape activists, while the five of Zuma supporters show them in 
huge, unruly numbers, often clashing physically with police. Following immediately (17-
22 Feb), there is a flurry of ten letters in only six days, and they are concerned 
exclusively with the behaviour of Zuma’s supporters outside the court. Nine condemn it 
and one defends the stance of Cosatu and the Youth League, two of the groups supporting 
Zuma.  
 
While the March pictures (thirteen) and letters (fifteen in all) are spread more evenly 
throughout the month, the distribution between the contesting camps is still skewed, with 
only two of the thirteen pictures portraying his critics outside court, but about 75 percent 
of the letters (eleven of the fifteen) critical of Zuma. The pictures of Zuma’s supporters 
continue to show high-energy turmoil while in the letters, his detractors continue to 
express outrage at these crowd scenes, especially near the beginning of the month.  Once 
the complainant begins leading evidence from 6 to 17 March, however, gender-sensitive 
criticism of Zuma’s behaviour on the night of the encounter becomes a new and powerful 
theme, running through no less than eight of the eleven letters. An interesting opposition 
arises between the two camps in their attitude to the trial’s outcome on the letters page, 
with pro-Zuma letters echoing a theme of ‘innocent until proved guilty’ and ‘let the court 
decide’, (though the irony of this stance becomes clear as the chapter unfolds) while the 
anti-Zuma letters state the view that the outcome of the trial is immaterial as Zuma has 
already demonstrated he is not presidential material, and express consternation at the way 
the legal process is playing out from a gender equality perspective. 
 
 Zuma’s evidence, heard between 3 and 7 April, provided his detailed version of the 
sexual encounter and his subsequent, now notorious, shower. Yet curiously, although 
Zuma’s extraordinary testimony elicited world-wide press coverage, relatively few 
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pictures and letters were printed in April – a mere two pictures, both of Zuma supporters, 
and five letters. Four letters are deeply critical of his sexual conduct and/or adamant that 
he cannot be president because of it, and one is from a supporter on what becomes a 
favourite topic of the Zuma camp, namely criticism of the media.  
 
The case was adjourned on 18 April, and then in May another flurry of letters (fifteen) 
appear, all in the week following the judgment on May 8.  What is interesting about these 
is that almost half, that is, seven of the fifteen,  are from Zuma’s supporters, the only time 
supporting letters come anywhere near the anti-Zuma letters numerically. In fact the 
seven also make up almost half the fifteen Zuma-supporting letters over the six-month 
period of the study. Many of these May letters carry a notably misogynistic theme, 
together with expressed satisfaction that ‘justice has been done’. There are only four 
pictures in May, three portraying Zuma supporters and one, anti-rape activists. There are 
no June pictures and only one letter; this expresses support for Mbeki in the succession 
race.  
 
In sum, numerically, both letters and pictures peak in March, and letters again in May, 
corresponding in the first case to both the theatre outside the courtroom and the 
complainant’s testimony, and in the second to the verdict (see Chart 1 below). What is 
interesting about this chart is the similarity in the trajectories of pictures of Zuma 
supporters and letters that are critical of him/them, peaking, as noted, in March. This 
correspondence is explored extensively during the course of this analysis.  
 
Second, four overlapping major themes emerge from the discussion above, each acting as 
a bone of contention, or nodal point, around which the contesting meanings of the two 
camps coalesce to construct opposing identities for Zuma and the complainant, who was 
code-named Kwezi to protect her identity. These four themes can be summed up as 
follows: the behaviour of the two opposing groups of supporters outside court; gender 
equality; the presidential succession race; and finally, the role of the media (Chart 2).   
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It must be emphasised that the graph in Chart 2 above does not indicate the total number 
of letters but the number of times a theme appeared in the group of 50 letters; for 
example a letter may have been coded for both ‘gender’ and ‘supporters’ and therefore 
would have been counted twice. No letter was coded for more than two categories. 
 
 
Theme 1: Representations of protests outside court 
Representations of the supporters in the pictures  
An examination of how the protesters were visually represented yields three interesting 
tendencies. First, the Sowetan tends to represent the two contesting groups of protesters 
in terms of order and disorder; Zuma’s supporters tend to appear as wild, out of control 
and constantly clashing physically with police and/or anti-rape activists, while the 
dominant representation of the complainant’s supporters shows them as reasonable, 
orderly and self-controlled, although this, importantly, was not always the case in real 
life, as we shall see.   
 
A second pattern in the pictures is, in line with Laclau’s populism, the remarkable 
diversity of the groupings that support Zuma’s cause. They range from Zulu ethnic 
subjects to western, urban Christian churches, civil society rights groups, various anti-
Mbeki lobbies and the unemployed masses as well as a wealthy elite with access to 
political power, legal representation and the latest technology. Finally, the overwhelming 
number of women playing active, vigorous roles and enacting ethnic performances while 
men are largely passive and in the background is noteworthy. I use these observations to 
structure the discussion below. 
 
a) Order and disorder in the pictures  
As touched on above, most of the pictures taken outside the courtroom depict Zuma’s 
supporters in huge numbers, waving hand-scrawled, mis-spelt placards or engaging 
vigorously with riot police. The far fewer images of the anti-rape activists, in contrast, are 
of much smaller groups, posters neatly and professionally printed, usually in orderly, 
static photographs. In this way the Sowetan’s overall representation of the contesting 
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groups creates the impression of order versus disorder: the anti-rape activists are already 
well-behaved, in fact personifying the middle-class, literate target market of the Sowetan, 
the ordered citizenry, while Zuma’s supporters are disorderly and the police, often 
foregrounded in the pictures, have to enforce order on them.   
 
• ‘Accuser now the accused’ (Appendix 5)  
The opposition of order and disorder can be illustrated with reference to a double-page 
spread (29 Mar: 6-7).  Here the large, bold, reverse upper case headline on the left page 
forms the focal point: ‘Accuser now the accused’. The headline anchors the meanings of 
the disparate images below it and to the right, and directs the reader’s reading of the 
collage. On the facing (right hand) page, two pictures are placed next to each other to 
form a stark contrast. On the right, forming the page lead (or focal point), a neat line of 
gender activists, all women, stand stock-still about three deep behind a restraining tape, 
holding posters against their chests or over their heads. The orderliness is not signified 
only by this stillness, but also in the uniformity of the posters, which are all the same size, 
and all professionally printed in the same upper-case font. They read: ‘Defending women 
rights’; ‘Innocent until found otherwise’9; ‘Don’t distort our rights’; and ‘Stop abusing 
our rights’. Such orderliness is further emphasised by their reflection in a puddle in the 
foreground, so still that the reversed lettering of the posters is undisturbed.  
 
To the picture’s left, in stark contrast, the customary is flagged.  A woman in ethnic 
clothing, turban and beads with her face painted in white ethnic patterns is foregrounded. 
Her right arm thrusts vigorously towards the camera so that her pointing finger looms 
into the top left corner and her mouth is open in a shout. She is being physically 
restrained by a policeman wearing a public-order bib, profiled face impassive, eyes 
shaded by his cap. Both are looking away from the camera.  A high-energy jumble of riot 
police and posters can be seen in the background. The tagline (a word or two in upper 
case preceding the caption, and separated from it by a colon) is ‘Overheated’ and the 
caption tells us: ‘A Jacob Zuma supporter is restrained by police after clashing with 
sympathisers of the rape complainant’. If the gender activists are represented as ordered, 
                                                 
9 Fascinating – for all the world as though it is the complainant who is on trial. 
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this woman is constructed in binary opposition – she is portrayed as disorderly and 
needing constraining.  However, another connotation must be pointed out:  the picture 
strongly evokes the social justice discourse of the ANC’s struggle days, when police were 
the enemy, brutally repressing public protests, or Laclau’s ‘populist ruptures’, over long-
ignored demands. 
 
By placing these two pictures alongside each other, then, the Sowetan signifies/articulates 
a contrast between order and disorder. The gender activists are represented as self-
controlled and law-abiding; personifications of the reasonable, neo-liberal human rights 
discourse, literate and ordered in their literacies, in fact the face of the Sowetan’s target 
readership. Zuma’s supporters, in binary opposition, are constructed as uncontrollable, 
chaotic and lawless – and these elements are conflated with tribalistic, primitive elements 
alien to a suburban, middle-class citizenry. 
 
• ‘Sex bill gets its day today’ (Appendix 6) 
In contrast to the picture above, one picture portrays gender activists being reasonably 
active and dynamic (3 May: 4). In it, three women are foregrounded. Their right arms are 
raised to the same height and their body stances, open mouths and facial expressions 
make it clear they are singing a rhythmical, energetic song, perhaps toyi-toying, but 
nonetheless in control and conscious, their facial expressions open to the viewer. The 
woman in the centre wears an ‘HIV positive’ T-shirt and the woman on the left, one that 
reads ‘Solidarity with  ♀’. This woman also has a striped kanga wrapped around her 
waist, a sign of solidarity with the complainant, who was accused of trying to seduce 
Zuma by wearing one on the night of their sexual encounter.  To the right of the picture is 
a headline: ‘Sex Bill gets its day today’. The subhead is ‘Zuma’s trial could have been 
different’. A pullquote (a sentence or two lifted out of the text and reproduced in large, 
bold print to capture the essence of the story) placed in the centre of the two-column story 
reads: ‘The complainant shouldn’t carry the burden of proof’.  
 
The Sowetan, then, has chosen to frame and contextualise the picture – and the rape trial 
– within the broader context of the disgracefully slow revision of the Sexual Offences 
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Bill, which, had it been passed before the trial, may have stopped Zuma’s legal defence 
team from discrediting the complainant (and thus the state’s case) in order to secure 
Zuma’s acquittal. In this way page design has been used to highlight a particular irony 
and gender-specific injustice inherent in the trial, and in any adversarial (as opposed to 
inquisitorial) legal system more generally. Importantly, this seems to provide an 
explanation for – in other words make reasonable and human – the protest in the picture. 
 
•  ‘Zuma’s Folly’ (Appendix 7) 
This pattern of representing order and disorder as binary opposites associated with gender 
lobby groups and Zuma supporters respectively is again apparent on a page published 
four days earlier (10 Mar: 19), an opinion piece rather than news (its text-heavy nature 
thus already excluding less literate readers), headlined ‘Zuma’s Folly’.  Other than this 
large, reverse-caps headline, the picture, placed top right on a right-hand page and framed 
by text left and below, is the focal point. In it, three posters, hand-scrawled and 
suggestive of semi-literacy as a result of the immature, unformed script, are foregrounded 
while the faces of the youths holding them and those of the youths crowded behind them 
are obscured by hats, the hard shadows of midday sun or the posters themselves.  What is 
interesting is the worm’s eye view (low angle shot) chosen by the photographer, which, 
unlike the frontal stance in the picture discussed above, gives extra prominence to the 
figures in the foreground and causes them to loom, while the awkward perspective of the 
buildings in the background indicates the barrel effect of an ultra-wide angle lens. The 
general impression, then, is of a faceless, dark and rather menacing crowd – in short, 
Mangcu’s ‘delusional mob’ (see Chapter Two), a picture that succeeds in alienating the 
viewer from the subjects. The picture’s tagline is ‘Chanting hate’, and the caption, 
unusually, is overt commentary from the Sowetan: ‘Claiming to know for sure what the 
court has yet to learn, Jacob Zuma’s supporters demonstrate outside the Joburg high 
court’.  Thus the Sowetan has directed the reader to feel critical of Zuma’s faceless 
supporters, constructed here as engaging in hate speech and, in spite of their social status, 
pre-empting a judge’s decision while they are scarcely literate, as their script connotes. 
However, a closer look reveals that this protest is actually just as static and orderly as the 
gender activists in ‘Accuser now the accused’, discussed above; the youths are, in fact, 
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simply standing still and peacefully holding up their posters. 
 
b) Diverse groupings in the pictures  
According to Laclau, the dynamics of populism work to unify disparate and 
heterogeneous demands and groupings, both by their opposition to the status quo and by 
the emergence of an ‘empty signifier,’ such as a hero’s name (in this study Zuma or 
Kwezi), which loses its own specificity as it stands in for the other specific demands.  So 
far, among Zuma’s supporters we have encountered Zulu ethnic women subjects, and 
poor, barely literate young men subjects in the pictures.  In addition, we know that Zuma 
is supported by the ANC’s Youth League as well as its alliance partners, Cosatu and the 
SA Communist Party, whose struggle history, nationalist ideology and urban base, one 
would think, would have caused them to shun the ethnic customary discourse based in 
rural KwaZulu-Natal.  However, Zuma’s supporters hail from many other spaces, equally 
divergent and sometimes equally contradictory.  I touch on only a few of these in the 
section below. 
•  ‘Strong Stand’ (Appendix 8)  
In this picture (14 Feb: 5)  Golden Miles Bhudu, self-appointed life president of the 
Prisoners’ Organisation for Human Rights (SAPOHR), stands in orange prison garb, 
chains wrapped around his body, holding a badly hand-scrawled poster that reads: ‘Jacob 
Zuma was raped’. Thus while his poster misappropriates the human rights discourse to 
construct Zuma as, presumably, the victim of violations of dignity and privacy, Bhudu’s 
body performance and dress express other grievances with the political order, such as 
rape in prisons. Bhudu, then, has seized on Zuma’s case as a platform and used it to air 
his own cause.  I point to only two more pages, both published on the same day, the day 
of the rape trial verdict, to give a sense of the diversity of Zuma’s appeal.  
 
•  ‘Fund Fun’ (Appendix 9) 
In this picture-story feature (8 May: 4), the picture shows a huge crowd seated on a 
grandstand. Two women are foregrounded, standing, arms raised in ‘struggle salute’ fists 
and faces animated and smiling. They are wearing ‘100% Zuluboy’ T-shirts and tribal 
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beads. One woman shades her head with cloth printed with the ANC logo. The picture’s 
accompanying story, headlined ‘Pre-trial jive’, details a huge fundraising concert of 
mainly maskandi (a commercialised Zulu ethnic music genre) held in his honour the day 
before his verdict, of which his dancing and singing were the highlight, particularly his 
signature tune, Awuleth ’umshini wami (Bring me my machine gun), for a cheering crowd 
of over ten thousand.  We are also told that praise singers compared Zuma to Mandela. 
The picture’s caption, which reads: ‘Jacob Zuma’s supporters paid R25 each to attend a 
concert in the Jabulani amphitheatre in Soweto yesterday’, flags the low ticket price as an 
indication of the underclass status of his support base. The picture is interesting not only 
for the blend of Zulu ethnic chic and ANC struggle history discourses, but in light of the 
picture discussed below. 
 
•  ‘Weeping’ (Appendix 10) 
Page seven of the same issue has a similar picture-story feature as its lead, the two 
forming the beginning and end respectively of a four-page news feature dedicated 
entirely to speculation about the verdict. The story, headlined ‘Zuma sobs’, details a 
Christian prayer meeting held in support of Zuma in Durban on the Saturday, the day 
before the maskandi festival in Johannesburg.  The subhead, alongside it and placed 
above a close-up picture of a pensive Zuma pushing his spectacles up his nose, 
presumably wiping a tear away, is: ‘Prayer meeting touches a raw nerve’. According to 
the story he ‘broke down’ sobbing, moving most of the congregation to sympathetic tears 
as well.  Juxtaposed with the ‘Pre-trial jive’ feature, this story is another indication of 
Zuma’s ability to play to seemingly contradictory audiences – from an urban, Western, 
Christian church in KwaZulu-Natal where he wept on one day, to a huge, upbeat festival 
of ethnic dancing, singing and drumming in Soweto less than twenty-four hours later. In 
contrast, Kwezi’s supporters, while made up of a number of gender lobby organisations, 
are visually represented as a reasonably homogenous group. 
 
c) Foregrounding of women and customary performance (Appendices 11 and 12) 
Already in several of the pictures discussed above we have seen how customary or 
traditional iconography performed by women is foregrounded in the Sowetan’s visual 
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mediation of the court protests. It is a recurrent theme. In one picture a woman in 
customary regalia is burning a pair of panties with a rapturous expression on her 
traditionally painted face (4 Apr: 4); in another a woman in a ‘Friends of JZ’ T-shirt – but 
again with tribal beads – kneels chanting before some smoking impephu (incense for 
purification and connecting with the ancestors in a customary ritual) with a young man at 
her side whose head is bowed and hands are clasped as though in prayer (16 Mar: 6). In 
each of these pictures, the  faces are obscured or turned away from the camera, or eyes 
are closed, ‘othering’ customary subjects and alienating the viewer from their rituals.  
 
In contrast, there are no pictures of the complainant’s supporters enacting customary 
performance or dress; as noted in the discussion of ‘Sex Bill gets its day’ the Sowetan 
generally frames and contextualises their performance to construct it as rational and 
orderly. What makes the Sowetan’s (and those of the media in general) representation of 
the two opposing camps in such binary oppositions as order and disorder, civilised and 
primitive, so fascinating is an observation from a journalist colleague who happened to be 
walking past the court during the trial. He saw a large unruly crowd, chanting, yelling and 
toyi-toying – and burning a picture of Jacob Zuma10. I am unaware of any such 
representations in the press, and the Sowetan certainly makes no mention of any such 
incident, while on the other hand stories, pictures and commentary on Zuma’s supporters 
burning effigies and pictures of the complainant and Mbeki were prominently featured. 
We have no way of knowing whether this was only one isolated incident or not, or 
whether any such incidents were recorded on film or not, or third, whether such putative 
pictures were rejected in the Sowetan’s production processes or not. Nonetheless, the fact 
that it happened at least once and was not recorded by the media, however ‘innocent’ the 
omission, is crucial to our understanding of how the two sets of supporters were 
represented11. I return to this important point in Chapter Five. 
 
 
                                                 
10 Interview with photographer Bazil Raubach,  August 2007 
11 To quote Berelson: ‘There is considerable opening for the collection of selective evidence … for 
overlooking the non-dramatic and focusing upon a few cases which may be quite untypical of the total 
output … there is a place for impressionistic observation, depending on the nature of the problem and the 
content to be analysed (1952: 119). 
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Representations of the supporters in the letters  
The ‘real time’ clash between anti- and pro-Zuma protesters outside court is carried 
through in the letters, with an overwhelming number criticising Zuma’s supporters on 
grounds ranging from intimidation to political insurrection. The supporters, in turn, attack 
gender activists, the media and human rights activists, mostly for violating rights such as 
freedom of expression. The underlying similarity, then, is the writers’ preoccupation with 
human rights, a theme already hinted at in many of the posters described above. This 
observation applies just as much to Zuma’s supporters as his detractors; in fact it appears 
in no fewer than twenty of the fifty letters, ten from each camp.   
 
•  Anti-Zuma letters 
The criticism levelled against Zuma’s supporters, abundant in February and March as 
noted above, constructs them much as the Sowetan’s pictures do: as an out-of-control, 
‘delusional mob’ who ‘insult[...] all rape victims and their families’ (17 Feb: 16) and 
manipulate the judicial process:  ‘The same people who supported the principle of 
innocent until proven guilty are seen hurling insults and throwing stones … we do not yet 
know who is wrong here … everyone else should stand on the sidelines and wait for the 
outcome … and the worst thing is to pick and choose presiding judges for the trial’ (17 
Feb: 16).  Again they are accused of pre-empting the judge’s decision: ‘People like 
[ANCYL leader] Fikile Mbalula … dancing in the streets proclaiming the former deputy 
president innocent, even before the case has begun … proclaiming the alleged victim to 
be a liar and this even before a court of law makes a finding’ (20 Feb: 12).  The support 
by Cosatu and the ANCYL for Zuma is constructed as ‘misleading and dangerous’ and 
they are cautioned against being ‘used as political pawns’ (17 Feb: 16), a reference to the 
succession race.  
 
Zuma is censured for both his personal conduct and that of his supporters. He, ‘the 
alleged rapist’ (we are reminded), is seemingly callous for he is reprimanded for ‘dancing 
and enjoying himself while the alleged victim has to cover her head to protect her 
identity’ (17 Feb: 16). Then he is sharply criticised as a weak leader for his ‘seeming lack 
of control’ over his supporters when they destroy ‘Mbeki’ T-shirts, ‘sing insulting songs 
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about the judiciary’ and ‘intimidate the complainant’ (20 Feb: 12).  
 
Zuma is also frequently criticised for appropriating his liberation credentials – in other 
words a social justice discourse – to serve his own purpose, in particular, for his use of  
the above-mentioned liberation struggle song Awuleth ’umshini wami, which became his 
signature tune during the course of this trial. In at least two letters, the song is seen as a 
sinister threat to democracy: ‘Zuma and his supporters [should] stop intimidating the 
judges, the complainant, her supporters and the nation as a whole and … desist from 
making threats of civil war if the judgment … does not favour them (22 Feb: 12) and: ‘Is 
he strategically passing a subtle message to his followers to get their machine guns and 
prepare for war?’ (17 Feb: 16). The same letter accuses ANCYL president Mbalula of 
‘behaving like a freedom fighter campaigning an unjust cause’. This places the social 
justice discourse in opposition to the rights discourse, which is linked with democracy. In 
another reference to the liberation struggle (this time linking social justice with human 
rights), a woman writes: ‘As a black woman who contributed to the struggle … it is 
understandable why the current generation of the ANCYL would find this disturbing 
exhibitionism acceptable but it is difficult to see how Zuma could let it pass … having 
served under Oliver Tambo’s leadership, he cannot be blind to the frightening effect of 
what is happening outside court’ (10 Mar: 18). 
 
The criticism of his supporters is frequently extended to concerns about gender justice, a 
theme we explore more fully in the section below. Often, Kwezi seems to personify a 
universal rape complainant, as when one woman asks: ‘What message will his 
supporters’ ugly intimidation send to the nation? Are they saying that any woman who 
dares to speak out against abuse will be intimidated? ... I have yet to hear or see Zuma or 
his lawyers condemn his supporters’ actions’ (10 Mar: 18).  
 
We have seen how the two discourses of social justice and human rights often merge in 
these letters; a significant number of them (five) express the view that Zuma and his 
supporters discredit the liberation struggle by their behaviour or, to put this in the terms 
of the analytical framework, they draw on a social justice discourse whose value system 
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is extra-juridical (and thus independent of current political institutions) for their critique.  
In line with this, as touched on elsewhere, many letters criticising Zuma are unconvinced 
that the complainant is getting or will get fair treatment from the legal system, a point I 
discuss further in Chapter Five.  
 
Yet, as we shall see below, both camps draw on the human rights discourse to invalidate 
each other’s position and place each other’s behaviour beyond the bounds of decency:  
they accuse each other of pre-empting the court’s decision and ignoring the ‘innocent 
until proved guilty’ dictum (correctly so, they both do this), of trying to intimidate a 
range of parties and of violating a range of constitutional rights. In fact, as noted above, 
this strategy is deployed in no fewer than twenty of the fifty letters, ten from each camp. 
It is worth pointing out that Zuma’s detractors do it more often near the beginning of the 
trial while his supporters use it more and more confidently as the trial progresses. 
 
•  Pro-Zuma letters 
Even if Zuma’s supporters wrote fewer letters to the Sowetan they are proportionately 
just as vocal in condemning the anti-rape activists that support the complainant outside 
the court. The activists are constructed as being hostile to men: ‘Are South African 
women’s organisations callous? ... The latest victim of their bitter war against males …’ 
(5 Jan: 12) and of violating Zuma’s right to a fair trial: ‘What does Powa’s12 presence say 
about the rights of a person who is innocent until proven guilty?’ (15 Mar: 14). However, 
ironically, Zuma’s (and their own) behaviour is simultaneously defended under the right 
to freedom of expression while the women’s groups are accused of being undemocratic 
and intimidatory: ‘Zuma’s critics are hypocritical … Let our people express their feelings 
and let the court process the case … this is a democracy and people must not be 
intimidated by contempt of court claims’ (22 Feb: 12).  
  
After the trial the complainant’s supporters are constructed within stereotypical 
patriarchal frames as shameful, noisy, irrational and in need of discipline from an adult: 
                                                 
12 One of the most vocal and visible groups supporting the complainant outside the court is called Powa, an 
acronym for People Opposing Women Abuse. 
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‘Organisations that supported Zuma’s accuser should feel ashamed of themselves. It 
seems they only make a lot of noise and don’t educate women about abuse’ (11 May: 12)  
and ‘All the pressure groups labelled Zuma a rapist before the trial even started … but 
justice has finally been done (10 May: 14).  Thus the ‘demands’ (in Laclau’s terms) of 
women’s organisations to recognise the crisis of rape and the injustices inherent in the 
systems that deal with both victims and perpetrators is constituted as ‘other’ and their 
demands are dismissed as  a ‘war’ against men.  Already, then, a gender theme is 
emerging. I examine this in more detail in the next section. 
 
To sum up the findings in this section, the two camps accuse each other of undermining 
democracy, jeopardising the fairness of the trial and violating each other’s constitutional 
rights, in the process exposing and further polarising gender divisions. Meanwhile I have 
pointed to a class dimension in the Sowetan’s visual mediations that on the one hand 
echoes the criticism of Zuma’s supporters on the letters pages, and on the other hand, 
tend to construct Zuma’s supporters as an irrational, savage mob, placing gender activists 
in binary opposition as well-behaved, law-abiding, rational, middleclass citizens. 
 
Theme 2: Representations of gender justice 
In the pictures, Zuma’s supporters tend to obfuscate and silence any question of gender 
injustice under their overriding construction of a conspiracy to discredit Zuma and thus 
prevent him from taking over the presidency from Mbeki. In contrast, gender power 
relations are a central concern in the letters. The dominant theme from his critics is that 
the behaviour of both Zuma and his supporters in this regard disqualifies him as a 
presidential candidate whether he is convicted of the rape or not. Letters from the pro-
Zuma camp in this regard reveal a deeply patriarchal and often misogynistic stance.  
 
Gender justice in the pictures 
•  ‘Zuma’s Folly’  (Appendix 7) 
I demonstrate how Zuma’s supporters swamp gender issues with the succession question 
by returning to the picture of three youths holding up posters discussed above in the 
section on the protesters, Zuma’s Folly.  The central poster, the focal point of the image, 
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asks: ‘How much did they pay you nondidwa’. There is no question mark at the end, 
turning the question into a statement of fact, an accusation that ‘Nondidwa’ (isiXhosa for 
slut/whore) was paid. The existence of an anti-Zuma lobby ‘they’ is taken as certainty 
and all possibility of there actually having been a rape is swept aside, rendered 
unthinkable, out of the question, through the construction of the rape complainant as a 
tramp, a liar and a tool of conspirators who would pay a woman to invent the accusation. 
The poster concomitantly declares its belief in Zuma’s innocence.  
 
The poster to the right of this reads: ‘Zuma for president 2009 if Madiba did it why not 
JZ’. With these words Zuma as a potential leader (president) is elevated to Nelson 
Mandela’s iconic status of both hero and martyr in the struggle for liberation; the present 
government is conflated with the brutal, oppressive apartheid regime which subverted the 
legal system to silence those who worked for social justice, thus symbolically linking 
Zuma’s rape trial with the Rivonia trial. This functions to highlight Zuma’s liberation 
struggle credentials, to discredit the current legal system and construct it as the enemy of 
both social justice and human rights, and finally, to once again proclaim Zuma’s 
innocence, no matter what the trial’s outcome.  
 
To the left, the third poster reads: ‘The leadership of this country especially the 
presidency is not a certain tribe thing. Zuma for president 2009’. This poster alludes to an 
ethnic contestation between Zulu and Xhosa people, introducing an element of ethnic 
tension present in Zuma’s supporters’ conspiracy theory and their construction of a 
Xhosa cabal intent on keeping a Zulu from becoming president.  
 
Together, the three posters present a classic picture of Laclau’s populism at work: power 
is constructed as top-down and repressive, working to frustrate the legitimate demands of 
the powerless, while the demands themselves, homogenised to their limit through chains 
of equivalence, are represented by the empty signifier of their leader and hero’s name, 
Zuma. With this focus on the succession, the fact that this is a rape trial is dismissed and 
invalidated as a ploy and the complainant is rendered bad, mad, outside reason, a 
perjuring tool of the sinister power. Importantly, with the social space so dichotomised, 
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leaving room for only two camps (the inimical power and the underdog) gender justice 
demands, personified by the complainant, have been linked with the repressive power 
through this same equivalential logic.  
 
• ‘Campaign trail’ (Appendix 13) 
Another poster stands out when considering the tangled threads of gender and succession: 
unusually for Zuma’s supporters it is professionally printed and equally unusually, it is 
held by a man. It reads: ‘Cosatu says Phumzile won’t be president’ (22 May: 13). The 
poster is a direct response to Thabo Mbeki’s announcement that he thought South Africa 
was ready for a woman president (the announcement was reported in the Sowetan (8 
May: 4) headlined ‘Mbeki’s timing raises gender issue for Cosatu’). The poster refers to 
Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka, who not only replaced Zuma as the country’s deputy 
president when he was fired by Mbeki after the rape accusation, but is married to former 
Scorpion head Bulelani Ngcuka, who led the fraud investigation of Zuma and his 
financial adviser Shabir Shaik, and who called the country’s newspaper editors together 
to tell them there was a prima facie case against Zuma but that charges would not be laid. 
It is thus an oblique restatement of the conspiracy theory, as Mbeki never named a 
particular woman in his announcement. Like the three posters in ‘Zuma’s Folly’, this 
poster obscures its patriarchal resistance to female leadership behind an adamant 
statement of resistance to Mbeki’s perceived attempt to name his successor, a point I pick 
up again in the following section discussing the letters.  
 
Gender justice in the letters 
•  Anti-Zuma letters 
Zuma is frequently othered for patriarchal and abusive behaviour, and condemned as a 
hypocrite and for setting a poor example to his followers, particularly in the context of his 
leadership position in the HIV/Aids pandemic at the time. The sexual encounter is not 
framed as rape but its gendered dimensions are foregrounded as immorality: ‘A man of 
Jacob Zuma’s stature … especially when the complainant happens to be the daughter of a 
friend of his, an Aids activist and half the man’s age. Not so long ago Zuma led our moral 
regeneration campaign, so quite apart from whether or not it was rape, what was the man 
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thinking? (15 Mar: 14). As a ‘public figure … adultery sets a bad example to the youth’ 
(13 Mar: 12); ‘He should not have slept with that woman without using a condom … he 
gave a speech in 2004 about how we should all be responsible about HIV-Aids’ (14 Mar: 
12) and ‘At his age, in his position, his behaviour is disgusting’ (10 Apr: 12). 
 
Considering the nature of the accusation it is unsurprising that much of the criticism 
levelled against Zuma in the letters relates to the inequality of gendered relations, both 
during the actual trial and outside. In other words, the responses are often located firmly 
within a social justice discourse, expressing anger at what anti-rape activists identify as 
social myths that naturalise violence against women even within a neo-liberal, Western 
human rights discourse, such as that what a woman wears and her previous sexual history 
have relevance for subsequent sexual violence: ‘I would not be surprised if the rate at 
which rape victims report their violations drops dramatically. Who wants her past sexual 
activities to be publicised and scrutinised? ... wearing a miniskirt will now be used 
against a woman who is raped’ (22 Mar: 12). The way the trial was conducted and the 
chances of justice for women from the legal system became a matter of critical concern 
for some writers: ‘How do you successfully interrogate someone about a sexual incident 
that happened when she was only five? … The woman will be interrogated by the 
defence lawyer until Zuma wins the case, but I still think he was evil to her’ (15 Mar: 14) 
and ‘He [Zuma] failed to show support for female emancipation when he allowed his 
lawyers to try to discredit the alleged victim’s previous abuse’ (31 Mar: 18).   
 
Thus for Zuma’s critics, the trial helped to crystallise and publicise perceptions of the 
failure of the rights discourse and its legal system to defend the vulnerable; importantly, 
the letter writers have deployed a social justice discourse to construct women as outside 
of the protection of the rights discourse – in short, as Laclau’s ‘underdog’, a strategy in 
collision with the one described above, where gender equality is linked with ruling 
hegemonies. But in addition, Zuma is criticised for placing social justice in opposition to 
gender justice when he conflates the African liberation struggle with his present troubles: 
‘His insensitivity in singing Awuleth’umshini wam at a rape trial, with all its phallic 
symbolism for me as a black woman is mind blowing’ (17 Feb: 16).  
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•  Pro-Zuma letters 
When it comes to gender relations a set of responses recurs in Zuma’s supporters that is 
deeply conservative of traditional patriarchy, in effect a backlash against any strides 
made in relation to juridical gender equality under Mbeki. The attacks incorporate those 
in the ANC who have been supportive of shifting gender inequalities, men are 
constructed as Laclaudian ‘underdogs’ and the present leadership is constructed as the 
enemy – once again, as in the mass protests, subsuming gender justice under the 
succession race. In a particularly bitter letter one man uses both the customary and the 
social justice discourses to construct men as ‘underdogs’ in Thabo Mbeki’s reign: ‘He 
has given women and children more choice than men … there are many divorces because 
of equality … During apartheid the black man was not free. Under Mbeki’s regime the 
black man is in a worse position’ (5 Jan: 12). In another letter, attacking gender activists 
for ‘try[ing] to convince us that the complainant was raped’, the human rights discourse 
is deployed to construct Zuma as a victim and a martyr, just as Golden Miles Bhudu did 
in his poster: ‘Why is the abuse of Zuma’s dignity being ignored? The claim by the 
woman has also revealed his sexual escapades, which are a private matter … Having sex 
without a condom is not a crime’ (31 Mar: 18). Considering that Zuma’s sexual history 
was never probed and the complainant’s was, this concern with the man’s right to privacy 
is somewhat ironic. 
 
After the judgment, the human rights discourse is again misappropriated to express 
outrage that traditional patriarchy has been challenged. ‘It is sad to see that many African 
women do not understand what rape and abuse is … do human rights only refer to 
women? What about poor men who are emotionally abused every day? Everything that a 
man does nowadays is wrong’ (11 May: 12). Then, convicted criminals are exonerated 
and future violence against women is condoned on the grounds that the convicts are 
victims of women: ‘I can imagine thousands of men who are serving sentences for rape 
and abuse, which they did not commit. What would happen when they come out of jail? 
They will be angry … women who falsely accuse men should be jailed for perjury 
…Women must realise that we are raising a generation that has fathers who have been 
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jailed for nothing … Zuma’s win was not only for him, but for all men’ (12 May: 18). 
The political pain evident in this letter indicates that once again the social justice 
discourse linked to the struggle history has tangled with customary values built into the 
patriarchal system.  
 
Thus for his supporters Zuma’s trial provides a virtual meeting point, or nodal point, 
where dissatisfaction with challenges to conservative and traditional patriarchy are 
articulated in chains of meaning with a misappropriated human rights discourse, working 
to construct women first as misguided for not knowing whether they have been raped or 
not, and then sinister, accusing perjurers who have robbed thousands of children of their 
male role models. Concomitantly Zuma, constructed as a martyr and a victim, personifies 
the victimhood of all men, and his acquittal symbolically vindicates the construction of 
women (and Mbeki for supporting their demand for equality) as the inimical other. 
 
Theme 3: Representations of the succession race  
As we have seen, Zuma’s supporters are vociferous about his succession to the 
presidency in their mass protests outside court. This makes it all the more curious then, 
that they are all but silent on the issue in their letters. In fact, only three of the sixteen 
letters concerning the succession race come from the pro-Zuma camp – and all three 
make the point that the presidency is not up for discussion, using two discursive 
strategies, which I discuss shortly. In contrast, the remaining thirteen letters are adamant 
that Zuma cannot be president after what the trial has revealed of his personal life, no 
matter what the trial’s outcome. No pictures of gender activists outside court make any 
reference to the succession debate. 
 
Succession in the pictures 
• ‘Viva JZ’ (Appendix 14) 
In the preceding sections I have already shown how Zuma’s supporters submerge the 
gender justice protest to focus adamantly on the succession race in their posters, while the 
Sowetan constructs their protests as irrational and alien to its urban, middleclass readers 
through conflating the disorderly with ethnic performance. These points having been 
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made, I turn to only one more picture (7 April: 6), which both underlines these two points 
and unpacks the conspiracy theory mentioned above. In it there is once again a woman in 
customary regalia and face paint, signifying that she is, in the Foucauldian sense, a 
willing ethnic subject. She holds up and points to a battered piece of packing-box 
cardboard covered closely with hand-printed script, so crudely written as to be barely 
legible. Her eyes are closed and the paint renders her face mask-like, impenetrable, and 
thus impossible to identify with. The poster reads:  
‘1. Where is Chris Hani? Assassinated before he succeeded Mandela. 2. Where is 
Ramaphosa? Forced to jet out of xx to consider business. 3. Where is Mathews 
Phosa? Stepped out of the race to follow business. 4. Where is Tokyo? Pushed to 
follow business. Next to poor comrade Zuma - they regard as illiteracy and 
pushed to courts because you wouldn’t accommodate business but president – 
they decided to take you to court for nothing. Viva JZ viva!’  
 
The poster’s litany of struggle heroes, here constructed as having been in one way or 
another ‘pushed out’ of line for the presidency, sets Zuma up as the next target to be 
demolished, this time through the courts, presumably so that the unnamed ‘they’ (Mbeki) 
can stay in power.  This reasonably sophisticated political account, so out of congruity 
with its tattered format and ethnically decked out proponent, succinctly summarises the 
conspiracy theory that contextualised the rape trial and constructed the rape complainant 
as a political pawn, while the dress performance again reminds us of the ethnic tensions 
alleged to be present in the succession race. 
 
Succession in the letters 
Zuma’s detractors’ theme that his behaviour precludes him from becoming president is 
constant throughout the trial, evoking Habermas’ ‘public sphere’ where the press 
functions as a ‘space between government and society in which private individuals 
exercise … informal control [over the state] through the pressure of public opinion’ 
(Curran 1997: 122). His supporters, however, without ever saying why they think Zuma 
should be president, are inscrutable on the succession issue and launch vitriolic personal 
attacks on anyone who criticises him. 
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•  Anti-Zuma letters 
Zuma is scorned as a hypocrite who is untrustworthy, lacks integrity and dignity, has 
shamed the country and no longer deserves to be a leader because of his sexual 
irresponsibility: ‘Zuma’s ambition of becoming president in 2009 is a pipe dream … the 
outcome of his two trials is immaterial … Msholozi has dug his own grave and we must 
wait by it to make sure he sleeps in it’ (17 Mar: 16) and, published on the same page:  
‘even if he is acquitted he can never be entrusted with the leadership of South Africa … 
we need a person who commands respect and has integrity’ (17 Mar: 16).  
 
The conspiracy theory is scoffed at and invalidated, and Zuma is constructed as a 
buffoon: ‘If there were a conspiracy… then his alleged detractors seem to know him well 
… once the right environment was set up he would do the rest himself’ (5 Apr: 12) and 
‘If indeed he is being politically victimised and crucified, then the conspirators … are 
damn good … this might be his end masterminded by himself’ (6 Apr: 12). Several letters 
from erstwhile supporters express how he has disappointed them:  ‘He has passed from 
the political elite to being an ordinary, shameful individual airing his dirty laundry … this 
marks his end in political power (6 Apr: 12).  
 
After his shower revelation, reported on April 6, this theme intensifies: ‘I am ashamed of 
his controversial views … he misled us because we did not know his beliefs … he is 
guilty of not practising what he preached … Zuma has let the country down, irrespective 
of whether he is guilty of rape’ (10 Apr: 12) and on the same page: ‘Did he think about 
the pain and humiliation to people who respect him?’ (10 Apr: 12). After the judgement: 
‘Jacob Zuma must just resign from politics because he has lost his dignity, if he ever had 
any. Sleeping with an HIV-positive person without protection does not say much about 
the morals of the person who is supposed to be the father of the nation’ (10 May: 14). 
 
•   Pro-Zuma letters 
As mentioned above, there are two discursive strategies at play in the three pro-Zuma 
letters that mention the presidency. One is to discredit his critics, and the second is to 
silence the debate by rendering it ‘out of place’. Two letters respond to doubts about 
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Zuma’s capacity to lead the country expressed in the Sowetan, singling out its freelance 
columnist Justice Malala, an outspoken critic, for personal attacks before deferring to 
party structures to invalidate any debate on who should succeed President Mbeki: ‘Justice 
Malala’s column on Monday has become an irritating mantra. The man has been so 
consumed by ANC deputy president Jacob Zuma’s case that he has been unable to write 
about anything else … The ANC has its own policies and the machinery of succession is 
in place’ (23 Mar: 12) and again: ‘If the views of your columnist Justice Malala … are to 
be believed the [ANC] would have been history by now … Fortunately the ANC is 
blessed with tried and tested procedures and structures. It will … deliver the correct 
candidates to lead the organisation and the country’ (6 Apr: 12).  
 
Thus the ANC is constructed as having processes that protect itself from poor judgement, 
and the journalist’s commentary is othered, delegitimised and placed outside its 
inscrutable fortress. (I return to the Zuma camp’s treatment of the journalist below in 
discussing the role of the media.)   
 
The third letter, while also deferring to party structures, is openly patriarchal, providing a 
patronising view of women as lacking and needing protection like children: ‘I was 
flabbergasted when President Thabo Mbeki told the nation that South Africa was ready 
for a woman president. Decisions in the ANC are not taken by individuals. They are 
debated within all structures of the party … women were previously disadvantaged and 
they need empowerment in terms of skills so that when they are in power they are not 
placed in jeopardy’ (12 May: 18). Women are thus constituted as incapable and 
vulnerable, although to what danger we are not told, and although black men have a 
similar history of disadvantage and disempowerment. 
 
What is interesting about these three letters is that they all try to invalidate individual 
opinions with reference to a collective identity; it is the party structures that decide, not 
individuals like Mbeki or Malala. The discourse of individual, universal human rights 
(such as freedom of expression) is thus disallowed, rendered illicit, impertinent and 
worthless, thus invalidating any debate on the country’s next president. Mamdani (1998: 
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1, see Chapter Two) points out that this distinction between individual and group rights 
corresponds to the chasm between civil rights and customary or ethnic ones. In the above 
letters, however, we see that this customary (patriarchal) discourse has fused with the 
social justice one that calls on the ANC’s ‘tried and tested’ liberation struggle history for 
authority. 
 
Yet the rights discourse is also deployed to construct all criticism as ‘out of place’. 
Malala, it is proposed (23 Mar: 12), also has no legal right to voice an opinion while the 
trial is in progress (although, as we saw in the section discussing pro-Zuma letters on the 
protests outside court, Zuma’s supporters demand the right to freedom of expression for 
themselves):  ‘Maybe he needs to be advised that the rape case is under the authority of 
the judge and is sub judice’. Only certain groups, then, may legitimately express only 
certain opinions. 
 
Theme 4: Role of the media 
There are no pictures that refer to the role of the media. However, as we saw above and 
will see again in the section below, Zuma’s supporters construct the media as part of the 
conspiracy against him. Five of the eight letters discussing this theme are from Zuma’s 
supporters. 
 
• Anti-Zuma letters 
Two letters critical of Zuma in January respond to an article written by Zuma himself that 
was published in the Sowetan (19 Jan: 15) in which he cites ‘six lessons’ that South 
Africa as a ‘young democracy’ should note. One of these two letters (23 Jan: 12) 
criticises Zuma for ‘lashing out at the media’ in his article. It deploys a liberal, civil 
rights-based discourse that encompasses a view of the media as the fourth estate and 
argues that  the media have a ‘moral responsibility’ to ‘report whatever is relevant and 
important’, as citizens ‘deserve to know everything, especially about a person who might 
be our next president’.   
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The second letter, published on the same page, expresses support for Zuma’s ‘legitimate 
fight’ but is critical of the ‘amateurish’ use made of the electronic medium by some of his 
supporters: ‘Worryingly he [Zuma] is silent on the insults [to Thabo Mbeki] that are 
flying around on the Friends of Jacob Zuma website … the continuation of these insults 
only helps to undermine his noble cause’. While the scope of this paper does not extend 
to discussing the role of the electronic media, it is interesting that a medium at present 
accessible to only the wealthy elite in South Africa was chosen by Zuma’s supporters, in 
light of the simple, rural, man-of-the-people identity he has constructed13 (for example, 
note the reference to ‘the masses’ in the last letter in the section below). 
 
•  Pro-Zuma letters 
The commentator most discussed by Sowetan readers is, as we saw above, its freelance 
columnist Justice Malala. Several letters construct Malala’s critiques as spiteful, ignorant, 
manipulative and deleterious: ‘Malala caricatures items to spread dirt on the character of 
Zuma … blaming the ANCYL for supporting Zuma instead of his accuser by virtue of 
her being in an age group of the constituency it represents equals blackmail. It fits a 
pattern of intolerance and an arrogant assumption … Put simply, Malala has the wrong 
end of the stick’ (23 Mar: 12). After the trial is over, Malala’s critique is delegitimised 
through the same strategy of ascribing mischievous motives to him when he is accused of 
‘waging a systematic campaign to write off leaders such as Zuma and Motlanthe’ and of 
‘sucking opinions from the thumb’: ‘Those who think like Malala are up to mischief. 
They want to impose the candidates they prefer on the party’ (6 Apr: 12). Malala, then, is 
part of the ‘conspiracy’. 
 
Other letters also appear to frame any criticism of Zuma or his supporters as part of the 
conspiracy. In contrast to praising the media for its fourth estate role, one letter (31 Mar: 
18) constructs the media as ‘irresponsible’ for allowing ‘pressure groups’ and ‘gender 
                                                 
13 In Raymond Suttner’s words: ‘I saw him respond to his dismissal as Deputy President through 
demagogic interventions, depicting himself – with SACP and Congress of South African Trade Unions 
(Cosatu) complicity – as a people’s leader, with some ambiguity that suggested he would be sympathetic to 
socialism.  I knew that such imagery contradicted his own record not only in government, but since 1990, 
(when he abandoned his membership of the SACP of which he had been a Central Committee member). 
(2007: 4) 
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activists’ the space to ‘ensure that the accuser’s version is accepted without question’  
and ‘analysts [the space to] convict Zuma in the court of public opinion’. In another (22 
Feb: 12), internationally renowned human rights advocate George Bizos is attacked for 
criticising the theatre outside the courtroom. The writer states: ‘In any conflict, hypocrites 
hide behind claims of objectivity while taking sides. This is what many commentators 
have done. They have lambasted the masses for doing what they believe is right’. The 
media, human rights lawyers and gender lobby groups are thus discursively linked 
through Laclau’s equivalential logic; they are thrown together into the ‘enemy’ camp and 
constructed as allies, or even co-conspirators, in a campaign to punish Zuma and his 
‘underdog’ masses who know what is right. I discuss these two letters in more detail in 
Chapter Five. 
 
To sum up the tangled threads of the above two themes, the letters page is embraced by 
the anti-Zuma camp as a ‘public forum’ to debate the presidency but utterly rejected by 
his supporters in favour of protest media such as posters and T-shirts. 
 
Conclusion 
We have seen in this chapter how the Jacob Zuma rape trial became, in Laclau’s sense, a 
nodal point for two populist fronts outside the court, each with a set of unaddressed social 
grievances or ‘demands’. Below I have represented graphically how these two 
antagonistic chains of meaning invested Zuma and the complainant with oppositional 
identities. On the one hand, a number of gender lobby groups used the trial as a platform 
to air ‘demands’ (or equivalentially linked chains of significance) such as patriarchal 
domination, gender-based violence, HIV-Aids and gender injustices inherent in the legal 
system. Gathering under the banner of ‘Kwezi’, they constructed her as the ‘underdog’ 
victim of all of these (and thus she personified all victims of sexual assault) as well as 
being the personal victim of Zuma: 
 
 73
Chart 3: Anti-Zuma position’s chains of meaning  
 
   
 
Meanwhile a more disparate set of groups gathered in huge numbers, with concerns 
ranging from prisoners’ and workers’ rights to ethnic pride; from poverty and 
unemployment to disgruntlement with Mbeki’s leadership style, none of which had 
anything to do with rape per se. These groupings coalesced under Zuma’s banner, 
constructing him as a personal victim of the complainant and the wider victim of a 
conspiracy to displace him: 
 
KWEZI 
AS 
UNDER 
DOG OF: 
ZUMA  
AS  
ENEMY 
PATRIARCHAL DOMINATION 
GENDER VIOLENCE   
UNFAIR 
TRIAL 
ANTI-ZUMA POSITION 
HIV-AIDS 
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Chart 4: Pro-Zuma position’s chains of meaning 
 
 
 
Thus, although the two, each with their hero/victims personifying a different kind of 
underdog, were at one in the sense that their sets of grievances were both with established 
political systems, or top-down repressive power, they also constructed each other as the 
enemy. For the gender activists, Zuma personified patriarchal domination rooted partly in 
ethnic cultural traditions, while for the Zuma camp the complainant came to personify the 
hated Mbeki regime, not only because for them she represented a deep-seated plot that 
encompassed this trial, his fraud investigation and the ‘e-mail hoax saga’, but also 
because, as we saw in the section discussing Zuma’s supporters’ letters on gender,  she 
personified the threat posed to established male dominance by gender equality, which 
Mbeki supported.  
ZUMA 
AS 
UNDER 
DOG OF: 
KWEZI  
AS  
ENEMY 
MBEKI 
CONSPIRACY 
GENDER 
EQUALITY 
PRO-ZUMA POSITION 
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The theatre outside court, then, closely resembled Laclau’s ‘populist rupture’, including 
frequent clashes between the groups or with police, and ‘demands’ expressed through 
other body performances such as burning effigies of the constructed enemies. In 
Mamdani’s terms this is the language of social justice, whereby in Africa’s history, 
independence was won with the force of numbers. On this front, then, gender justice 
appears to have lost the battle; it was swamped and almost silenced by the sheer force of 
numbers that framed the trial within succession and conspiracy narratives.  
 
However, the collision between the discourses was examined on a second front: in the 
‘public forum’ of letters to the editor the polarised positions waged the same war to try 
and fix meanings in particular ways and thus exclude all other meaning potentials. The 
impasse can be summed up in terms of the four themes as follows: (1) Because of the 
gender-related behaviour of Zuma and his supporters he can never succeed Mbeki as 
president and we have the right to express this view through any medium. (2) There is 
nothing wrong with our behaviour or Zuma’s and any demand through any medium for 
gender equality is part of the plot to prevent his succession. In line with the reasoned, 
neoliberal, human rights-based nature of this platform the physical violence was absent; a 
second difference between the two platforms is that the force of numbers went the other 
way. However, it remains to be seen whether gender justice emerged – or will ever 
emerge – the winner.  
 
In Chapter Five I scrutinise three more letters in order to unpack the class and gender 
faultlines along which the camps appear to have split, and to probe one more instance of 
the Sowetan’s active mediation in these divisions. 
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 CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In the introduction to this study I stated that the aim of the project was to examine the 
Sowetan’s mediation of the contesting ‘voices’ of citizens as they responded to the Jacob 
Zuma rape trial.  To carry out this study I proposed to conduct a critical discourse 
analysis, focusing on protests outside the courtroom and letters to the editor.  The 
analysis, guided by a thematic content analysis of the material, thus took on a double-
pronged task. On the one hand I proposed to explore how seemingly contradictory 
discourses such as ethnic traditionalism, social justice and human rights were 
operationalised and articulated within two sets of responses, those pro- and those anti-
Zuma. On the other hand, I wanted to examine the Sowetan’s role in mediating these 
responses for its readers. To this end – or these ends – I chose an eclectic approach which 
encompassed and knitted together several theories of power and meaning. 
 
 
In Chapter Two I outlined these various theories to create a framework of analytical tools 
based on Laclau and Mouffe’s (1985) theory of meaning (with emphasis on their 
conceptualisation of discourses as struggling for hegemony through the appropriation of 
nodal points, which in turn organise discourse through chains of equivalence). This set up 
the critical discourse analysis of the contesting pro- and anti-Zuma positions as creating 
antagonistic chains of meaning around the identities of Zuma and his complainant.  
Laclau’s (2005) analysis of populism, which flows from Laclau and Mouffe’s theory, 
also informed the analysis in Chapter Four, while it was from Mamdani’s theorisation of 
power and resistance in post-colonial Africa that I drew out the three above-mentioned 
discourses of ethnic traditionalism, social justice and human rights and identified them as 
being at play in the pro- and anti-Zuma contestation. Mamdani’s ‘social justice’ 
discourse, which is rooted in Africa’s struggle for independence and liberation, I argued, 
is linked with Laclau’s populism through its extra-juridical status. Finally, I located this 
study within a growing body of post-Marxist and post-colonial African literature for the 
focus on identity construction and ‘othering’ that they share. 
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In Chapter Three I discussed the methods I used to conduct Chapter Four’s analysis, and 
some of their epistemological implications. In Chapter Four I conducted a thematic 
content analysis, which enabled the extraction of several major and overlapping themes 
running through the material. I then conducted the critical discourse analysis according to 
the methods described in Chapter Three, structuring the discussion according to the 
themes that had emerged.  I worked from the premise that letters to the editor would fall 
largely within a neoliberal human rights discourse associated with a literate and 
privileged middle class, while the protests outside court would speak the language of 
marginalised groupings whose demands were not being met by an inimical institutional 
system – in short, who operated within Mamdani’s discourse of social justice, which I 
expected to conform with Laclau’s theorised dynamics of populism. 
 
In the course of the analysis, the Sowetan appeared to be located firmly within the human 
rights discourse, with its visual mediation of the mass-based protests outside court 
reflecting the same elitist horror of mob violence – or populist ruptures from a frustrated 
underclass – that was expressed by an overwhelming number of its letter-writers. I 
concluded the chapter with a graphical representation of how, according to Laclau and 
Mouffe’s (1985) theory of meaning, the two contesting positions, pro- and anti-Zuma, 
might have constructed conflicting identities of ‘underdog’ and ‘enemy’ for Zuma and his 
accuser in terms of Laclau’s populist dynamics, deploying discourses of ethnicism, 
human rights and social justice to other and invalidate each other’s positions as  
they did so. 
 
In this final chapter, I examine the emergent class and gender divisions hinted at above, 
as articulated in several letters published in the Sowetan. In conclusion, I scrutinise the 
Sowetan’s role in these divisions. 
 
The class faultline 
Two letters to the editor were briefly touched on near the end of Chapter Four in 
discussing pro-Zuma letters to the editor on the subject of the media’s role in the trial. 
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These letters (31 Mar: 18 and 22 Feb: 12) showed that Zuma’s supporters linked the 
media, human rights lawyers and gender lobby groups as allies, or even co-conspirators, 
in a campaign against Zuma. I return now to examine this construction in more detail. 
 
As mentioned in Chapter Four, the letter of (22 Feb: 12) attacks, along with gender 
activists and the media, the ‘respected advocate George Bizos’. Bizos was criticised for 
commenting that Zuma’s supporters’ behaviour ‘borders on contempt of court’ and 
‘undermines the administration of justice’. ‘This is a democracy and people must not be 
intimidated by contempt of court claims,’ the writer argues. ‘Bizos and company do not 
speak up when those outside the court support alleged rape victims’.  
 
Thus Bizos, once a liberation struggle hero for human rights work such as the part he 
played in the Rivonia trial defence team, is now othered by that same struggle (social 
justice) discourse; he is constructed as deploying the human rights discourse to defend a 
top-down and elitist institution and frustrate the legitimate demands of the marginalised 
and oppressed. In short, he has joined the enemy camp.  
 
In Laclau and Mouffe’s theory, identities, whether individual or collective, are formed 
through chains of equivalence that establish some possibilities of identification while 
others are ignored. This logic of equivalence, or equivalential mode of articulation as 
they also call it, is a two-pronged discursive strategy which works first to constitute a 
group by its ‘other’, that is, by what it is not, Us and Them; and second, to ignore all 
differences within the group. This is the strategy at work in the letter above: the ‘other’ 
group has been homogenised: human rights lawyers, gender activists and the media are 
all constituted as one on account of their critical stance of Zuma and/or his supporters. 
Laclau’s mechanism of populist discourse is also at work, since the writer has given the 
‘other’ group the power and thus constituted his (the writer is a male) group as the 
underdog: ‘Bizos and others have information that those gathering outside court do not 
have’.  This construction of the human rights discourse as inimical and ‘other’ also 
echoes Mamdani’s identification of a ‘breach between the discourse on rights and the one 
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on justice, with the language of rights appearing as a fig leaf over privilege’ (see Chapter 
Two). 
 
Another letter from a Zuma supporter casts a fascinating light on the class dynamics at 
play here. It is, in fact, worth quoting in full. Headlined ‘Hypocrites see only one side of 
the Zuma coin’, it reads: 
 
Some commentators are apparently perplexed by the support Jacob Zuma 
continues to get, especially among women.  
Gender activists and some women’s organisations have argued that the support 
undermines the struggle against women and child abuse.  
Women supporting Zuma may look ordinary and might not work in plush offices 
like our sophisticated critics, but they surely have a bigger picture of what’s 
happening in court. 
The advantage activists have is easier access to the media, as opposed to ‘street 
columns’ used by Zuma’s supporters outside court.  
The two sides speak to two different audiences and past each other. 
Fortunately though, the matter is now before the courts and justice will prevail. 
Some argue that Zuma supporters are intimidating the accuser and probably the 
judge but what about articles dedicated to vilifying Zuma? Don’t these intimidate 
Zuma and the judge? What does Powa’s presence say about the rights of a person 
who is innocent until proven guilty? Only hypocrites see one side of the coin. (15 
Mar: 14) 
 
The (male) writer points bluntly to a gulf between classes that, in his eyes, leaves women 
‘haves’ and ‘have nots’ with no common bond; they are ‘two different audiences’. He 
constitutes gender activism as the exclusive domain of ‘sophisticated’ people in ‘plush 
offices’; women who support Zuma, in binary opposition, are common folk and ‘look 
ordinary’. In addition, while these activists have ‘easier access to the media’ (presumably 
due to higher literacy levels) through their social location they are unable to access the 
‘bigger picture’ that can be gained from the ‘street columns’ outside the court. The 
media, then, is constructed as part of this ‘other’ that is not ‘ordinary’ or everyday;  part 
of a privileged elite speaking to a ‘different audience’; both Zuma’s critics and the media 
are othered and excluded by a disdainful inscrutability that constructs them as not worth 
engaging with, and simultaneously as privileged objects of resentful envy.   
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The writer, however, has constituted himself with the authority of an insider, someone 
who can articulate the world through the eyes of the misunderstood masses, including 
women. Yet at the same time, like the writer of the letter about Bizos, he ‘underdogs’ the 
masses (the social justice discourse), placing the power to define the terms of the 
contestation squarely in the hands of the educated middle class:  ‘Some argue that Zuma 
supporters are intimidating the accuser and probably the judge, but what about articles 
dedicated to vilifying Zuma? Don’t these intimidate Zuma and the judge?’ 
 
The primary dividing line that separates Zuma’s supporters from his detractors, this 
writer implies, is that of class – and as we have seen in Chapter Four, the Sowetan at least 
in part subscribes to this view, with its overt and covert othering of Zuma’s underclass 
and ethnic supporters in its visual mediations. But were this to be the true dividing line, 
and were the writer’s homogenisation of the ‘enemy’ to be accurate, that would mean that 
the Sowetan concomitantly supports the demands of Kwezi’s supporters for gender 
justice on all its fronts.  I return to this observation shortly in order to test it. 
 
The gender faultline 
To return briefly to the letter, we note that the argument of gender activists, (that is, that 
women’s support for Zuma undermines fighting gender abuse), is noted but not taken up. 
With this strategy, just as we saw in the discussion of the ‘Zuma’s Folly’ posters in 
Chapter Four, the discourse of gender justice is simultaneously trivialised in the face of 
some unspecified ‘bigger picture’ hinted at, and rendered unreasonable, inappropriate, 
unthinkable. The implication is that were the deluded gender activists to grasp the ‘bigger 
picture’ (presumably the plot to prevent Zuma, champion of the masses, from gaining 
political control) they too would no longer bother with fighting women and child abuse.  
 
Up until now I have restricted my discussion of the Sowetan’s visual mediations to 
pictures. I turn now to an examination of its stance on gender justice demands by 
returning to one more letter to the editor and placing it in its own ‘bigger picture’, that is, 
the context of the page (Appendix 15). The letter was touched on briefly in Chapter Four. 
I reproduce it here in full. Headlined ‘Rape is about rape’, it reads:  
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In the wake of the Jacob Zuma rape trial, I would not be surprised if the rate at 
which rape victims report their violations drops dramatically. Who wants her past 
sexual activities to be publicised and scrutinised? Why is a rape charge not treated 
only as such? I bet my last cent that wearing a miniskirt will now be used against 
a woman who is raped. My concern is what message is being sent to young 
minds. (22 Mar: 12, italics inserted) 
 
The letter is a ‘filler’, the least significant item on the page, relegated to the smallest 
bottom left corner of the letters space. In the inmost left column is the editorial. In this 
issue, the editor has pronounced on two issues, the first taking up two thirds of the 
column. The second, with the subhead ‘Vanity of flesh’, ironically, is placed alongside 
the letter ‘Rape is about rape’ – and equally ironically, is also concerned about what 
message is being sent to young minds. It reads: 
 
One never knows whether to laugh or cry when it comes to singer Kelly 
Khumalo, the self proclaimed 21-year-old virgin. 
It is admirable for any young woman to abstain from indulging in matters of the 
flesh until she finds the right partner, but the way Kelly carries on seems to send 
mixed messages. 
Dressing scantily and performing sexually charged dances, as Kelly does, hardly 
encourages morality. 
But if Kelly is a virgin we must applaud her, especially given the scourge of Aids 
that has taken its toll on our young people. 
The only problem, perhaps, is that so many people don’t believe she is still a 
virgin. Pity that her raunchy actions so contradict her assertions. 
 
Thus, with pompous pronouncements that link dress to morality (whatever that is), 
relegate dancing to ‘carrying on’ (whatever that is) and imply both that Khumalo is 
probably lying about her virgin status (and that if she is one, that would make her ‘moral’ 
– and more desirable) this editorial functions to invalidate and trivialise a fundamental 
gender justice demand in the letter adjacent to it  – and this, in the middle of the ruling 
party deputy president’s rape trial in which the dress of the woman complainant was 
presented – and accepted – as crucial evidence of his innocence. In a final (unintended) 
irony, the cartoon at the top of the page, a comment on international politics, makes 
reference to Human Rights Day, celebrated the day before this issue. 
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The Sowetan has thus ‘mainstreamed’ and endorsed views on gender that cut across 
ethnicity, race, class, modernity and tradition: from Zuma’s Zulu cultural traditions to his 
white Afrikaans judge’s, from the poor and dispossessed who burn pictures of Mbeki in 
frustration to the Sowetan’s comfortable, elite readership.  Gender rights, concomitantly, 
are marginalised, even silenced. The Sowetan may pay lip service to them when they 
seem to reflect its readers’ values and views – as long as, in other words, they are neat 
and orderly (not wild and savage, burning effigies and tangling with police, as we saw in 
Chapter Four; not spontaneous and high-spirited, exulting in their sexuality like Kelly 
Khumalo). In fact, as long as they don’t challenge the systemic (patriarchal) power 
structure running through all the above societal divisions.  My point is that whether or not 
Kwezi is a rape victim, and whether or not Zuma is a conspiracy victim, the real victim of 
this contestation between the two positions has been gender justice – and the Sowetan is 
shown here to have been complicit in this.  
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14-Feb 5 Strong 
stand:
Miles Bhudu, life president of  
the Prisoners’ Organisation for 
Human Rights, stages a picket 
during the Zuma rape trial.
A full-length cutout picture of  
Golden Miles Bhudu, life presi-
dent of  the Prisoners’ Organisa-
tion for Human Rights, in chains 
and prison garb, dominates a 
colour box with a thick black 
frame at the top of  the page. 
Bhudu is placed centre, divid-
ing the box, a story on either 
side. He stands with feet planted 
apart, holding a badly written, 
hand-scrawled poster balanced 
against his shoulder, with the 
poster protruding into the text of  
the story to the left. In his other 
hand are gathered the chains 
around his body.  
poster - JZ was raped - 
so say SAPOHR
14-Feb 5 Trial turmoil Police hold back onlookers 
yesterday during the rape trial of  
embattled ANC deptuy president 
Jacob Zuma
Above right of  ‘Strong stand’ is 
a small horizontal picture, ‘Trial 
turmoil’. Blurred with action, a 
line of  police officers is shown 
from behind in full riot gear bat-
tling to control the crowd. The 
story to Bhudu’s left is headlined 
‘Recusal worries black lawyers’, 
with the 2-column text framing a 
thumbnail of  Bernard Ngoepe, 
the judge who recused himself. 
Below right is the story ‘Protest-
ers clash at Zuma trial’.
16-Feb 28 Stand back:  A policeman battles to control 
the crowd outside the high court 
yesterday. 
 A crush of  people bearing down 
on the riot cop
16-Feb 28 Huge sup-
port: 
 Thousands of  people braved the 
rain outside the Jhb high court 
yesterday to show support for 
ANC deputy president Jacob 
Zuma, who is being tried for rape. 
 Pritchard Street is packed tightly 
with people.
16-Feb 28  Women’s 
solidarity:
 Activists against the abuse of  
women demonstrate outside the 
high court.
 Hands holding up a profession-
ally printed poster; bgd a few 
faces and two obscured posters 
also being held up
poster - rape is always a 
crime
 1 a 
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7-Mar 4 Backlash: Members of  women’s groups 
shout anti-Jacob Zuma slogans 
and demonstrate outside the Jhb 
high court yesterday
A woman is in the foreground 
with the arm raised and finger 
pointing above her head. Next 
to her another woman gestures. 
Other women are in the back-
ground, some holding posters. 
T-shirts - HIV positive & 
solidarity with women. 
Parts of  the words ‘crimi-
nal’, system and rape 
can be discerned on one 
poster. The other 2 are 
illegible
9-Mar 4 Watchful 
eye:
An armed member of  a special 
task force monitors the crowd at 
the trial of  Jacob Zuma, who is 
the accused in a rape trial being 
tried in the Jhb high court
A blond youth in military gear 
with machine gun in foreground; 
bgd is a mix of  military & crowd
9-Mar 4 Defiant: A woman shows her support for 
former deputy president Jacob 
Zuma outside the Jhb high court
An enormous woman raises her 
fist and places her other hand 
across her breast. In the back-
ground other women are raising 
fists and shouting
Performance: struggle fist
8-Mar 6 Faithful: Jacob Zuma’s supporters pray 
for him outside the Jhb high court 
during lunchtime break yesterday
Three-col pic of  three women in 
foreground standing together, all 
wearing JZ Tshirts, eyes closed 
and passionate looks on their 
faces. Many faces behind them.
T-shirt - Zuma
10-Mar 19 Chanting 
hate: 
Claiming to know for sure what 
the court has yet to learn, Jacob 
Zuma’s supporters demonstrate 
outside the Jhb high court.
Three youths stand in front of  the 
courtroom holding posters
Posters say: 1) How 
much did they pay you 
Nondidwa 2) Zuma 
for president 2009 - If  
Madiba did it why not 
JZ. 3) The leadership of  
this country especially 
the presidency is not a 
certain tribe thing Zuma 
for president 2009
14-Mar 6 Aikhona: Jacob Zuma supporters outside 
the Jhb HC where the former 
deputy president is appearing on 
rape charges
Two women pointing at the 
camera and yelling are in the 
foreground. Men further back are 
silent.
15-Mar 4 Toyi toyi: Jacob Zuma’s supporters at the 
Jhb HC yesterday during his trial 
for rape
Young men toyi-toyiing with court 
building in background
Struggle dance
16-Mar 6 Purification: ANC supporters of  Jacob Zuma 
sing freedom songs and burn 
impepho, an African herb used in 
cleansing ceremonies.
People kneel in front of  a smok-
ing bundle, box of  matches on 
the ground next to it. Two people 
are foregrounded: R, a woman 
who seems to be chanting, 
wearing a Friends of  Jacob Zuma 
T-shirt, jeans and traditional 
beads, baseball cap with peak 
backwards; next to her is a young 
man with head bowed and hands 
clasped as though praying
Tshirt - support FoJZT. 
Performance: ritual 
cleansing/ call to ances-
tors 
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29-Mar 6&7 Overheated: A Jacob Zuma supporter is 
restrained by police after clashing 
with sympathisers of  the rape 
complainant
A gesticulating woman in tribal 
gear is held by two riot policemen 
with impassive faces. Her arm is 
raised and her finger points at the 
camera
Customary dress
29-Mar 6&7 High spirits: Jacob Zuma supporters show 
their support for the former 
deputy president outside the Jhb 
HC where he is appearing on a 
rape charge.
A large crowd is dancing in 
the street, with buildings in the 
background. A woman in tribal 
headgear is foregrounded in 
profile, one leg in a high kick. 
Above is huge two-stack reverse 
caps headline
Zuma T-shirts
29-Mar 6&7 Placard 
protest:
Members of  women’s rights 
groups have attended every day 
of  the trial.
A line of  women standing behind 
restraining tape with profession-
ally printed posters reflected in 
water 
Posters: 1) Innocent until 
found otherwise 2) De-
fending women rights 3) 
Don’t distort our rights 4) 
Stop abusing our rights.
30-Mar 4 Rumbunc-
tious:
Once again Zuma’s supporters 
clashed with the police outside 
the Jhb HC yesterday
A man is shouting and gesticulat-
ing with a riot policeman on either 
side of  him. One of  the officers 
pushes or hits him on the back 
with his baton
30-Mar 4 True believ-
ers:
Jacob Zuma’s supporters clad in 
Tshirts proclaiming ‘Jacob Zuma 
100% Zuluboy’.
Large crowd of  shouting gesticu-
lating youths behind a strained 
tape, Zuma’s face prominent on 
T-shirts
T-shirts - zulu boy
4-Apr 4 Take that: Supporters of  rape accused Ja-
cob Zuma burn a pair of  panties 
outside the Jhb HC yesterday.
A woman in tribal gear, closely 
surrounded by a crowd, holds 
up a piece of  underwear. The 
pic is taken from below and at 
an angle, making the people 
and buildings in the background 
loom. The fire is not visible in the 
picture - only the cap tells us she 
is burning the item. The page 
is dominated by a large reverse 
caps headline, ‘She was ready 
for sex’ and the pic is framed by 
two stories, one of  his version of  
the night and the other alluding to 
the conspiracy
Performance: burning 
panties
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7-Apr 6 Viva JZ: Zuma supporters outside the 
Jhb HC where Jacob Zuma’s trial 
continues.
Two women hold up a large, 
shabby, creased piece of  
cardboard with closely written, 
koki-penned text printed in a 
semi-literate hand. The woman 
on the right, pointing to the text, 
is in tribal gear, the one on the 
left in urban jeans and T-shirt.
Poster says: 1. Where is 
Chris Hani? Assassinat-
ed before he succeeded 
Mandela. 2. Where is 
Ramaphosa? Forced to 
jet out of  xx to consider 
business. 3. Where is 
Matthews Phosa? 
Stepped out of  the race 
to follow business. 4. 
Where is Tokyo? Pushed 
to follow business. Next 
to poor comrade Zuma - 
they regard as illiteracy 
and pushed to courts 
because you wouldn’t ac-
commodate business but 
president - they decided 
to take you to court for 
nothing. Viva JZ viva!
3-May 4 Defiance: Women from anti-rape groups 
demonstrate outside the Jhb HC 
as the state and the defence 
in the Jacob Zuma rape trial 
resume their closing arguments.
Women yelling and thrusting their 
arms forward. One is in a kanga.
T-shirts - HIV+, solidarity 
with women
8-May 3 Clear mes-
sages:
Supporters of  former SA deputy 
president Jacob Zuma dem-
onstrate outside the Jhb HC, 
pending today’s outcome of  his 
trial for rape.
Yelling crowd in Zuma T-shirts 
are holding three posters above 
their heads. Left of  the pic is 
large reverse caps headline: 
‘Innocent’.
Posters: 1) Come 2007 
conference of  the ANC, 
and Mbeki out… 2) 
Whether the next presi-
dent is a man or woman 
that debate is imeterial. 
It raises by stupit people. 
3) Back to basics building 
democratic ANC
8-May 6 Faithful: Jacob Zuma supporters in full 
song outside the Jhb HC.
Mainly women w 100% Zuluboy 
Tshirts on, yelling, fists raised
Tshirts - Zuma
22-May 13 Campaign 
trail:
Other candidates duck out of  
sight as Zuma heads out to 
canvas votes
Foregrounded in the centre is a 
professionally printed poster with 
the Cosatu logo. It is held by a 
man who may be yelling. He is 
standing still and only his head 
and shoulders are visible above 
the poster. He is neatly dressed 
with a good haircut. Around and 
behind many people are milling. 
Two Cosatu T-shirts are visible. 
One person has an Aids arm-
band on.
Cosatu says Phumzile 
won’t be president
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DATE PAGE HEADLINE DETAIL THEME PRO/ ANTI
05-Jan 12 Still no freedom for black men “• Mbeki wrecking families by giving women 
equality 
• Govt doesn’t recognise customs 
• It’s worse now than under apartheid”
GENDER P
10-May 14 Women’s groups not interested in 
facts
“• Disturbing Powa statement that acquittal 
blow to reducing rape stats – shd he be 
found guilty just to reduce the stats? 
• They jumped to conclusions – guilty b4 
the trial started 
• Now justice is done 
“
GENDER P
10-May 14 Fight for rights must be equal “• Innocent till proved guilty 
• Stand for equal rights but mean women’s 
rights 
• A man can be the victim of  the allegations 
“
GENDER P
11-May 12 Educate women about abuse “• Happy justice prevailed 
• Sad so many African women don’t know 
what rape & abuse is anything passes cos 
law on their side 
• Hr only women’s rights? 
• Poor men emotionally abused every day 
• Nowadays everything men do is wrong 
• JZ humiliated, what will happen to her? 
“
GENDER P
12-May 18 Zuma victory is a win for all men “• Thousands of  men sentenced for rape & 
abuse they didn’t commit 
• They’ll be angry when they come out 
• Must take law seriously when it says in-
nocent till proved guilty 
• Women who falsely accuse shd be jailed 
for perjury 
• We are raising a generation whose fathers 
were jailed for nothing 
“
GENDER P
16-May 12 Crime of  rape is misunderstood “• One in 9 convictions – can’t blame legal 
system 
• Became apparent that most don’t 
understand what rape is – thus many false 
allegations 
• Govt must educate about what rape is 
• Zuma rights to dignity & reputation seri-
ously violated 
“
GENDER P
15-May 12 Zuma must lead fight for moral 
regeneration
“• Charge doesn’t mean guilty 
• Stigma of  rape makes people think guilty 
• JZ apology shd be accepted – he learnt 
his lesson 
• Many people in parliament can’t go public 
about what they’ve done 
• He’s the one to lead HIV fight and MRC 
cos of  what he’s gone thru 
“
MEDIA P
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31-Mar 18 Media playing a dangerous game 
with public
“• Gender activists enjoy space in media 
trying to convince us JZ guilty 
• Do they think we should just accept what 
she says? 
• Media irresponsible to allow this 
• Why is abuse of  JZ being ignored? 
• His private life revealed 
• Sex without a condom not a crime 
“
MEDIA-GENDER P
06-Apr 12 Malala making mischief  in ANC “• Malala waging campaign to write off  lead-
ers like JZ and Motlanthe 
• ANC got own structures that will deliver 
correct candidate 
“
MEDIA- 
SUCCESSION
P
23-Mar 12 Malala, get off  Zuma’s back “• Malala caricatures JZ, spreads dirt, says 
he’s unfit 
• ANC has own machinery 
• Conspiracy to emasculate 
• Intolerance & arrogance 
• To say YL should support her cos she’s 
young & he’s old is blackmail 
• Wait for court decision 
“
MEDIA- 
SUCCESSION
P
12-May 18 Mbeki must consult instead of  giving 
his opinion
“• Flabbergasted re woman president – got 
to be debated in ANC structures 
• Shdnt exaggerate gender equality – 
women PDI, still need skills 
“
SUCCESSION-
GENDER
P
22-Feb 12 Zuma’s critics are hypocrites “• Bizos says FoJZ in contempt of  court cos 
undermining admin of  justice 
• But they believe innocent until proven 
otherwise – why doesn’t Bizos crit Powa? 
• People must express themselves in a 
democracy 
• Commentators pretend objectivity but 
lambast the masses 
“
SUPPORTERS P
21-Feb 10 People who give Zuma support are 
not fools
“• Cosatu & YL are anti-rape but possible 
that complainants can lie 
• Would support anybody whose rights were 
being violated 
• ‘our people will never again be black-
mailed by a false moral stance’ 
“
SUPPORTERS P
05-Jan 12 Don’t judge, let courts decide Powa waging ‘bitter war against males’ 
Emotion-based assumptions b4 court 
decision 
SUPPORTERS-
GENDER
P
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15-Mar 14 Hypocrites see only one side of  the 
Zuma coin
“• Commentators perplexed at support from 
women; Powa says it undermines women’s 
struggle 
• But FoJZ women have a bigger picture 
• Powa has access to media, FoJZ to ‘street 
columns’ 
• The two sides can’t hear each other 
• Court will bring justice 
• Some say FoJZ intimidating judge & 
complainant but aren’t Powa/media intim 
judge & Zuma? 
• What does Powa say about innocent till 
proven guilty? 
“
SUPPORTERS-
MEDIA
P
14-Mar 12 Zuma ignores own advice • JZ should be blamed for risking HIV and 
not walking his talk
GENDER A
15-Mar 14 This is too embarrassing “• MRC leader – even if  not rape what was 
he thinking, ½ his age and HIV+ 
• Court has not and will not be fair to her 
“
GENDER A
22-Mar 12 Rape is about rape “• Sure rape reports dropping – sex past 
scrutinised 
• Miniskirt now an excuse 
• What message to youth 
“
GENDER A
31-Mar 18 Knockout blow for Zuma “• He doesn’t care what trial has done to 
him, party or country 
• Judgement question – HIV+ 
• Morals question – MRC 
• Dnt support  women allowing lawyers to 
discredit her 
• Shd have seen it wd raise questions about 
MK camps 
• Blasphemous JC pedestal 
• Lied about relationship with her 
“
GENDER A
10-Apr 12 Guilty or not, the Zuma issue is about 
being a good role model
“• Selfish sexual needs 
• Battle against Aids 
• Pain & humiliation of  those who respect 
him 
• He says culturally wrong to discuss sex w 
daughter but then she has to defend him in 
court 
• Leading youth astray – shower, risk for few 
mins of  pleasure that shd get from wives  
• Apologise, be good role model 
“
GENDER A
10-Apr 12 Msholozi has let South Africa down 
terribly
“• Ashamed of  JZ – views contrary to 
leadership & world 
• Shower; short skirt; leaving her aroused = 
rape charge 
• Uncontrollable sex urge? 
• Dnt practice what he preached in NAC – 
respect women, use restraint 
• Let country down even if  not guilty 
“
GENDER A
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08-May 12 Zuma’s troubles caused by lack of  
education
“• He achieved what others cdnt even 
without ed 
• But if  had school, wdnt have said that 
stuff  in the rape trial 
• Would have understood Shaik misleading 
him 
• Would have understood Aids & kept away 
from temptation 
• Would have outgrown narrow rural and 
tribal male chauvinism 
• Brave son of  soil, took more risks for MK 
than intellectuals 
• But even warriors need ed to face per-
sonal challenges 
“
GENDER A
10-May 14 We do not take rape seriously “• Woman has to flee her home 
• Message she shd keep her mouth shut? 
• FoJZ makes it look like SA doesn’t take 
rape seriously 
• Married man, political leader – irrespon-
sible 
• What chance for youth with that eg? 
“
GENDER A
12-May 18 Every rape must be reported “• Despite judgement gender work must 
go on against ridiculous and old-fashioned 
notions 
• Women must report rape – not be put off  
• Right to dignity in constitution 
“
GENDER A
11-May 12 Walking the rape tightrope “• Rape & false allegations both evil – we 
have to walk the tightrope 
• Judiciary must mediate 
• Must fight for HR – rape terrible, men 
must fight it, protect & respect women 
• But some women use hatred of  rape to 
destroy men with false allegations, this 
violates men’s rights 
“
GENDER A
23-Jan 12 Let the media do their job properly “• JZ crits NPA but no-one is above the law 
• He crits media but they have a ’moral 
responsibility’ to inform us 
“
MEDIA A
10-May 14 Morality key to judgment of  office 
seekers
“• If  morality were law JZ would have been 
guilty & sent to jail – as wd others 
• But no-one could cast the first stone 
• Our hypocritical moralists don’t lead the 
public castigation of  JZ 
“
MEDIA A
23-Jan 12 Zuma must stop insults directed at 
Pres Mbeki
“• Don’t agree w scorpions BUT 
• JZ must denounce Mbeki insults on FoJZ 
website 
• They undermine his ‘legitimate fight’ and 
‘noble cause’”
SUCCESSION A
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17-Mar 16 Immorality and the presidency are not 
exactly bedfellows
“• MRC leader dug his own grave - ‘to want 
him for president is catastrophic’ 
• Can’t understand FoJZ supporting candi-
date who show such poor judgement 
• Married man, should lead by eg esp with 
HIV crisis 
• Outcome of  trial immaterial – he’s dishon-
est and chooses bad company 
• SA can’t sacrifice its gains for him, we 
must wait by grave to ensure he stays in it 
“
SUCCESSION A
17-Mar 16 Zuma can never lead the country “• Even if  acquitted on both charges can’t 
lead country 
• Image dented, should leave public life 
• Mbeki’s successor must command inter-
national respect 
• ‘Those who subscribe to violence… 
warlord mentalities must be condemned 
regardless of  struggle credentials’ 
• Deafening silence from black intellectuals 
– consumed by profit, forgotten the poor 
“
SUCCESSION A
31-Mar 18 Crisis threat in position for president • Mbeki shd consider 3rd term – one candi-
date has issues, other possibilities have not 
had leadership tested
SUCCESSION A
05-Apr 12 Zuma would be a gamble “• If  there was a conspiracy then the detrac-
tors know him well – give him the setup, 
he’ll do the rest himself  
• Rape immaterial – married, slept w HIV+ 
• Sign of  other blunders? 
“
SUCCESSION A
06-Apr 12 Political power lost as Zuma washes 
dirty linen in public
“• Passed from political elite to shamed & 
ordinary – end of  political power 
• If  it’s a conspiracy they’re damn good – 
but he might have masterminded it himself  
• Ruling won’t matter, he can’t be respected 
after this 
“
SUCCESSION A
10-May 14 Zuma has no dignity and must quit 
politics
“• Speech after acquittal disturbing – 
bragged about getting away with it 
• Lost dignity, shd resign 
• HIV+, can’t lead the nation 
“
SUCCESSION A
05-Jun 12 Thabo Mbeki is an exceptionally good 
president
“• Mbeki great president 
• Vavi and Fikile Mbalula think JZ their meal 
ticket 
• Mbalula not doing his job, maybe too busy 
supporting comrade standing trial 
“
SUCCESSION A
15-May 12 Adultery a bad example to set • Public figures shd try to practice the vows 
they made when got married
SUCCESSION-
GENDER
A
22-Mar 12 Malala punting Mbeki for another 
term is disturbing
“• Agree with Malala JZ & FoJZ conduct bad 
• But Mbeki not the only candidate – ANC 
has lots of  talent at the top 
• Disturbing thought of  3rd term – must set 
eg for Africa 
“
MEDIA-SUCCES-
SION
A
2 e
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17-Feb 16 Singing of  struggle song is sinister “• JZ support in rape trial ‘misleading and 
dangerous’ 
• ANCYL & SACP ‘shocking’ & ‘hypocritical’ 
• Disappointed in Fikile Mbalula for ‘behav-
ing like a freedom fighter campaigning an 
unjust cause 
• Cosatu agitating the poor - workers don’t 
understand govt empowerment policies – 
Cosatu job to teach them 
• Umshini wam JZ message to prepare for 
war? 
“
SUPPORTERS A
20-Feb 12 Zuma has lost control of  his support-
ers
“• ANC member – JZ and Mbalula must 
stop supporters: 
o Destroying Mbeki Tshirts 
o FoJZ songs insulting judiciary 
o Intimidating complainant 
o  undermining judiciary 
“
SUPPORTERS A
22-Feb 12 JZ supporters’ behaviour appalling “• ACDP joins CGE, HRC & Powa concerns 
about FoJZ behaviour 
• ANC should condemn it and tell JZ not to 
sing mshini wam 
• Also disallow posters inciting violence 
• JZ et al must stop intimidating judiciary, 
complainant, her supporters & whole nation 
• & stop threatening civil war 
“
SUPPORTERS A
14-Mar 12 Christians sinking in immoral cess-
pool
“• Leader of  MRC accused of  rape & cor-
ruption 
• Followers cause chaos outside court & no 
action taken 
• Meant to be an African leader but laughing 
stock 
“
SUPPORTERS A
12-May 18 Zuma’s free so let us leave Kwezi and 
her family alone
“• Respect judge decision but poor Kwezi 
in exile 
• Msholozi tell followers to leave her in 
peace 
“
SUPPORTERS A
17-Feb 16 Give Zuma’s accuser the chance to 
present her case
“• Who gave supporters right to hurl stones 
& insults? 
• Accused ‘dancing & enjoying himself’ ac-
cuser has to cover her head – is it a shame 
to seek justice? 
• Supporters shouldn’t tarnish her image – 
makes JZ seem disrespectful & insensitive 
• Worst thing to pick & choose judge 
• Innocent till proved guilty – wait for 
outcome 
“
SUPPORTERS-
GENDER
A
2 f
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17-Feb 16 JZ backers are insulting all abused 
women
“Don’t want next generation to learn this 
• Innocent till proven guilty but ‘spare a 
thought for the victim’ 
• Cosatu & YL insulting rape victims & 
families 
• Shdn’t be keeping workers from work & 
children from school ‘immoral propaganda 
body’ – collect money for an alleged rapist 
• Think about abused women and ‘come to 
your senses and don’t be used as political 
pawns’ 
“
SUPPORTERS-
GENDER
A
17-Feb 16 SA women should be deeply con-
cerned
“• Women should be dismayed by ‘spectre’ 
outside court 
• Insensitivity of  phallic mshini wam ‘mind-
blowing’ 
• Hope judiciary not intimidated 
“
SUPPORTERS-
GENDER
A
20-Feb 12 Sheer hypocrisy prevails at the 
former deputy president’s trial
“• Mbalula prancing in the street proclaiming 
his innocence b4 trial even begun, some 
women old enuf  2b her mother 
• Same pl accuse media, judiciary & others 
of  finding him guilty of  corruption 
• Threatening victim, accusing her of  being 
used by conspirators thus calling her a liar 
b4 court judgement 
• What hapnd to Msholozi’s MRC? 
“
SUPPORTERS-
GENDER
A
20-Feb 12 Rape trial is a shameful display for 
SA
“• SA humiliated b4 world intimidating victim 
• No chance women can be protected? 
“
SUPPORTERS-
GENDER
A
10-Mar 18 Zuma must condemn ugly behaviour 
of  his supporters
“• JZ, who led the MRC, must condemn 
ugly scenes outside court – women also 
contributed to liberation 
• Message – women who speak out get 
targeted 
• Govt promoting women’s lib but who would 
seek justice after seeing this 
• Can see why YL finds it acceptable, they 
grew up while women were fair game but 
not Zuma, he served under Tambo 
“
SUPPORTERS-
GENDER
A
13-Mar 12 Rape trials and abuse prove women’s 
struggle is not over
“• Women’s struggle far from over, - politics, 
bz, poverty, abuse 
• JZ bad eg for youth - adultery 
• Why WL silent 
• Women supporting Zuma disgraceful 
message 
“
SUPPORTERS-
GENDER
A
29-Mar 16 Jacob Zuma’s supporters must stop 
treating him like God
“• JZ not god – all humans fall short 
• Shortcomings publicised cos public figure 
• Support  4 rape accused demoralised SA 
– condone it depending on who did it? 
• See JZ thru her eyes – HIV+ 
“
SUPPORTERS-
GENDER
A
2 g
APPENDIX 2: Table of letters
JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN
PRO-ZUMA LETTERS 2 1 4 1 7 0
ANTI-ZUMA LETTERS 2 9 11 4 8 1
3 a
JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN
PRO-ZUMA PIX 0 5 11 2 3 0
ANTI-ZUMA PIX 0 1 2 0 1 0
APPENDIX 3: Chronology charts
3 b
JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN
LETTERS 4 10 15 5 15 1
PIX 0 6 13 2 4 0
APPENDIX 3: Chronology charts
JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN
ANTI-ZUMA LETTERS 2 9 11 4 8 1
PRO-ZUMA LETTERS 2 1 4 1 7 0
ANTI-ZUMA PICTURES 0 1 2 0 1 0
PRO-ZUMA PICTURES 0 5 11 2 3 0
4 a
APPENDIX 4: Chronology and theme overviews
THEME ANTI-
ZUMA
PRO-
ZUMA
THEME 
TOTAL
Gender 19 9 28
Supporters 14 4 18
Succession 10 3 13
Media 3 5 8
Total 67
Media-gender 1
Media-succession 1 2
Succession-gender 1 1
Supporters-gender 8 1
Supporters-media 1
4 b
APPENDIX 4: Chronology and theme overviews
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